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MIMICKING THE WORDS, BUT MISSING
THE MESSAGE: THE MISUSE OF
CULTURAL FEMINIST THEMES IN
RELIGION AND FAMILY LAW
JURISPRUDENCEt
LINDA J. LACEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the nineteenth century, images of religion and the family, like
images of women, were carefully constructed to represent ideals that
were the exact opposite of the commonly accepted characteristics of
capitalism) Both the church' and the family3
 provided a retreat from
the competitive atmosphere of the marketplace— "a haven in a heart-
less world"4—where higher values of caring and unselfishness reigned
supreme. Women, who exhibited "natural and proper timidity and
t Copyright 1993 Linda J. Lacey.
"'Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; B.S., University of Wisconsin (1967);
J.D., UCLA College of Law (1978).1 would like to thank Marianne Blair, Susan Chase, Stephen
Feldman and Adam Thurschwell liar their helpful comments on a draft of this article and Curt
Allen for his research assistance. Michele Schultz did her usual excellent job of deciphering my
illegible handwriting and producing a professional final product,
1 The following chart represents the concepts traditionally associated with "private" sphere
entities like the "church" and huidly, and "public" ones like the market and the state.
"Private" "Public"
Religion Family "Market" "State"
Unquestioning Unquestioning Reason Efficiency Neutrality
Faith Loyalty
Moral Behavior Cooperative Behavior Competitive Behavior Law Enforcetnent
Self-sacrifice Self-sacrifice Self-Gratification Self Preservation
Spiritual Nurturing Self-Serving Sell Defense
Atmosphere Atmosphere Atmosphere
2
 See MARK HOWE, THE GARDEN IN THE WILDERNESS (1965).
3 See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Markel: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. lbw. 1497 (1983).
4
 CHRIS"l'OPLIER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: 'rim FAMILY BESIEGED (1977).
1
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delicacy" and were unfit "for many of the occupations of civil life," 5
belonged in the private shadows of these two major institutions. 1
Changes in attitudes about women in the twentieth century have
been paralleled by major changes in family law, and law and religion,
brought about by the dominance of liberal thought. 8 The liberal model
of law and religion jurisprudence continues to place religion in a
private sphere,' but the primary rationale for separating "church and
state" 1 " has shifted from a goal of protecting the church as well as the
state to a goal of safeguarding the state against sectarianism." An
increased emphasis on pluralism and secularism has virtually removed
religious language from dialogue about legal issues. 12 Family law has
moved from a patriarchal structure to a model of formal gender
equality with an emphasis on rights of individuals within the family's
In both areas, a growing number of commentators, discontented with
the highly individualized, rights-oriented jurisprudence have begun to
attack the "official" 14 liberal version of the law.' 5 Many of these attacks
5
 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 140 (1872) (Bradley, J. concurring). In this infamous case,
the Supreme Court held that women could be constitutionally banned from practicing law,
''The public/private dichotomy has been well documented in legal literature. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRITIQUE, 13,17-21 (David Kairys ed., 1990); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline
of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
7 See Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious
Authority, 26 J. FAM. LAW 741 (1988) for an interesting discussion of the relationship between
church, state and family spheres.
" See generally Mensch, supra note 6, at 31-33.
g See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1154-1 301 (2d ed. 1988)
(affirming distinction); Frederick Mark Gedicks and Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and
Values: Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1579 (1987)
(criticizing distinction).
10 1 use the generic term "church and state" because it is so common in the jurisprudence
of the field. 1 am well aware that the term explicitly excludes most non-Christian religions,
especially Judaism.
11 A number of historians have challenged the concept that the original focus on separation
of church and state was to protect the state. See, e.g., HowE, supra note 2.
12 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVIC'T'IONS AND PRIVATE POWER (1988); MI-
cilAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(1991); Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transferring Moral Conviction
Into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501 (1989); see also infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Frances Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality:judicial Assaults on Feminist
Community, Illinois, 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518 (1986); Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as
an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865 (1989); Martha Minow, Forming Underneath Everything That
Grows: Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Iti;:v. 819. See also infra notes 133-40 and
accompanying text.
to
	 concept of "official" and "unofficial" versions of the law is that of Robin West, one of
the roust important cultural feminists. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Ctu. L. REV.
1, 12 (1988).
15
 See infra notes 37-43, 141-55 and accompanying text.
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come from traditional conservatives;i 6 however increasingly they also
come from the left, or at least from people using the language of the
left. 17 Although the specific doctrines discussed differ, critics of liberal
thought in family law and law and religion jurisprudence emphasize
similar themes. Both groups argue that mainstream jurisprudence
in these areas is overly concerned with rights, not responsibility,
and autonomy, not relationships. 18 Both call for a return to "moral"
dialogue in the formulation of laws in the area.° On the surface,
these commentators have much in common with cultural femi-
nists24 (alternately referred to as relational 21 or difference femi-
16 1n the area of law and religion, the most prominent conservatives include Michael McCon-
nell, John Noonan, and David Smolin. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. In the area of
family law, they include Bruce Haien and Carl Schneider. See infra notes 151, 161-68 and
accompanying text.
17 1n the area of law and religion, the most prominent "leftist" critics are Mark Thshnet and
Alan Freeman and Betty Mensch. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. In the area of
family law, the most prominent example is Mary Ann Glendon. See infra note 149 and accutnpa-
nying text.
18 See infra notes 45-52,147-55 and accompanying text.
I° See infra notes 117-18,147-55 and accompanying text.
20 It is not easy to give a definition of cultural feminism, because any description of the genre
is shaped by the author's attitude toward its themes, Leslie Bender, a cultural feminist, refers to
"a school of feminist theory that acknowledges women's gender differences." Leslie Bender, From
Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VERT.
L, REv. I, 1-2 (1990) [hereinafter Bender, Gender Difference]. Deborah Rhode elaborates on this
theme: •
[T] his strain of feminist theory has not merely celebrated values traditionally asso-
ciated with women, It has insisted that these values be valued and has demanded
changes in occupational structure, public policies, and male attitudes. The point
has been not simply to celebrate women's experience, but to change men's, to affect
their conduct in work, family, and political contexts.
DEBORAH RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 3{19 (1989). A critic of cultural feminism offers this
definition:
This theory suggests that the moral reasoning of women differs from that of men
because of their psychological development, and that women's different voice is at
least equal, if not superior, to masculine reasoning. Typical characterizations of this
difference are that women are relational, connected, practical, and have an ethic
of care, whereas men are individualistic, objective, abstract, and have a justice of
right.
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of Imagina-
tion, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109,120-21 (1991).
21 This term is used to describe the aspect of cultural feminist theory which stresses its
emphasis on relationships. This term is used by Martha Minow, among others. See MARTHA
MINOW, MAKING Au. 'rHE DIFFERENCE 219 (1990). I have chosen to use the term cultural
feminism throughout this Article, because it expresses the theme that I find most compelling:
the concept that women are shaped by their culture in certain ways. See infra notes 248-54 and
accompanying text. Cultural feminism is occasionally described by its critics as biological femi-
nism, which suggests that its proponents believe women's biology alone differentiates them from
men. This viewpoint is frequently attributed to Robin West. See, e.g., Patricia Cain, Feminism and
4	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:1
nists22) who also criticize the liberal emphasis on autonomy and self-
interest,2' and advocate an "ethic of care" and ideals of cooperation
and responsibility. 24
 This commonality intrigues and infuriates me be-
cause, although the critics of liberal religion and family law jurispru-
dence mimic cultural feminist themes, their ultimate goals and pro-
posals are often detrimental to most women and antithetical to goals
of most feminists. 2'
In this Article, I will explore the ways in which three representative
authors ultimately miss the substantive messages of cultural feminism.
Since this distortion of cultural feminists' language may seem to vali-
date the arguments of their critics, 26 I will also respond to some of the
the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv. 803, 837 n.128 (1990). I do not personally subscribe to this
aspect of cultural feminism, but 1 think the critics' descriptions of West's views have been
somewhat exaggerated. The only feminist whom I would describe as a purely biological feminist
is Marie Ashe. See infra notes 112, 184, 241.
22 This term refers both to cultural feminists' emphasis on differences between men and
women and to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL. THEORY AND WOMEN 'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982), a work which has had an enormous influence on feminist thought.
Gilligan's work is a study of the difference in the reasoning of boys and girls, which suggests that
boys' reasoning tends to be more hierarchial and girls' reasoning more relational and contextual.
23 Far an excellent overview of the criticism of liberal thought by cultural feminists and a
challenging defense of liberal thought, see Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberal-
ism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171 (1992). The classic description
of the relationship between liberalism and feminist jurisprudence is West, supra note 14.
"The authors advocating this theme are too numerous to cite in a single footnote. A
representative list includes: Judith Areen, A Need for Caring, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1067 (1988);
Katherine 'I', Bartlett, Re
-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988); Leslie Bender, A Lawyers'
Primer on Feminist Theory and Tart, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Bender, Lawyers'
Primer]; Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re) 'kris: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and
Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848 [hereinafter Bender, Feminist (Re) 'forts]; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculation on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S U. 39 (1985); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv.
1279 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A
Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory ofJustice, 16 N.M.L. REV. 613 (1986); Judith Resnik, On the Bias:
Feminist Reconsideration of Aspirations for Our judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988); Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543
(1986); West, supra note 14.
25 See infra notes 57-70, 157-58 and accompanying text.
26 Again, a single footnote can only provide a partial list of criticisms of cultural feminism.
The most important include: CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93-102 (1987)
[hereinafter MACKINNON]; Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Micti, L. REV. 797 (1989)
[hereinafter Williams, Deconstructing]; Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate:
A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L. J. 296
[hereinafter Williams, Postmodern]; Joan C. Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic
of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (1991) [hereinafter Williams, Gender Wars]; Drucilla Cornell,
The Doubly Prized World: Myth, Allogamy and Feminism, 75 CORNEL1, L. REv. 644 (1990); Angela
P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Patricia A.
Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S U. 191 (1989-90);
Jeanne U. Schroeder, Feminism Hislesicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Femi-
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major criticisms of cultural feminism 27
 and conclude by arguing that
its themes continue to have much to offer to women's struggle against
subordination.28
II. ATTACKS ON THE LIBERAL VISION OF LAW AND
RELIGION JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Prevailing Doctrine and Its Challengers
According to liberal philosophy, the ideal society is one in which
individuals are given the maximum amount of freedom to make ra-
tional, autonomous choices." Therefore, establishment of religion is
undesirable because too-powerful religions inevitably restrict individ-
ual religious preferences. 3° Freedom of religion is desirable because it
enhances the rights of individuals to observe personal religious prac-
tices. Religion properly belongs in a "private" sphere, into which the
government cannot and should not intrude, and conversely religious
beliefs should not permeate the "public" sphere—the realm of govern-
ment. The courts should strive toward neutrality in decisionmaking
regarding church and state issues, and the government's stance toward
religion should also be neutral—neither hostile nor approving.'" The
ideal society, then, is one of religious pluralism. 32
 "Moral" dialogue has
no place in legal discourse, which should consist of reasoned, objective
arguments and principles." There are distinct dichotomies between
"science" and "religion,"34
 and between "knowledge" and religious "be-
liefs."'' These basic principles are the underpinnings of current law
and religion doctrine. The metaphor of a "wall of separation" between
nisi Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1135 (1990); Schroeder, supra note 20; Mary Joe Frug, A
Post-Modern Feminist Legal Manifesto, 105 HARV. L. R.E.V. 1045 (1992) (hereinafter Frog, Mani-
festo]; Mary Joe Frog, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim, "A Different Voice"?,
15 1-IARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 37 (1992) thereinafter, Frug, A Different Voice].
27 See infra notes 206-47 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 248-88 and accompanying text.
23 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12 (1980).
30
 For a historical account of the tendency of religion to oppress individuals, see LEo PFEFFER,
CHURCH, SLATE, ANI) FREEDOM (let ed. 1953).
31 See, e.g., Philip 11. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 2-6 (1961).
32 ACKERMAN, supra note 29, at 1-44, 345-78.
89 For an interesting discussion of this viewpoint, see Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal
State Can Promote Moral Ideals After All 104 HA RV. L. REV. 1350 (1991),
34
 For a challenge to this statement, see Alan Freeman and Betty Mensch, Religion as Sci-
ence/Science as Religion: Constitutional Lain and the Fundamentalist Challenge, TIKKUN Nov.—Dec.
1987, at 64 thereinafter Freeman and Mensch, Religion as Science].
88 Id.
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church and state is consistent with the public/private distinction—the
wall is necessary to prevent an overlapping of the two spheres."
In the past two decades liberal philosophy about the relationship
of religion and the state has come under increasing attack, both in the
judicial opinions and in law review literature. The traditional accom-
modationists adopt the starting point that religion or "morality" has
an important place in public life and cannot be shuttled into its own
separate sphere; instead, it must be "accommodated."37 In contrast, the
primary emphasis of the "new wave" scholarly critics is not a positive
affirmation of the merits of religious values, but rather a negative
criticism of liberal thought about religion." These critics are generally
affiliated with less traditional areas of scholarship, such as critical legal
studies" or law and economics." The attack on liberal thought by
36 Emerson v. 11d. of Edttc., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). Justice Black wrote: "[t]he First Amendment
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept impregnable. We could not
approve the slightest breach." Id.
"Former Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Scalia, White and Rehnquist have repeatedly
expressed this opinion in Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
677 (1984) ("equally persuasive is the evidence of accommodation of all faiths and all forms of
expression . ."); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). Michael McConnell and John
Noonan are two of the most important proponents of this viewpoint among academics. See, e.g.,
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation in Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60
G.W.L. REV. 685 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Ctn. L.
REV. 115 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious
Schools, 109 HARV, L. REV. 989 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion
Clauses, 81 N.W. L. REV. 146 ( 10.81i) 1 T. 1'4, ; JOHN ....00NAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT
ARE: CASES, HISTORY, AND OTHER DATA BEARING ON THE RELATION OF RELIGION AND GOVERN.
mErfr (1987); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Constitution's Protection of Individual Rights: The Real Role
of the Religion Clauses, 49 U. MT. L. REV. 717 (1988); John T. Noonan, Jr., Principled or Pragmatic
Foundations for the Freedom of Conscience, 5 J. LAW & RELIGION 203 (1987). Many accommoda-
tionists are also originalists, who argue that the framers, at least the majority of them, never
intended for the religion clause to apply to the states, and that the federal government was simply
required to promote neutrality among religious sects, but was not prohibited front offering any
aid to religion.
38 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Religion in Politics, 89 CoLum. L. REV. 1131 (1989) (book review);
Comments on Gedicles and Ball, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Putt. PoL'Y 457 (1990); The
Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701 (1986). Tushnet argues that liberal thought in the
area of law and religion is indeterminate, ultimately self-destructive, and ignores the tradition of
republicanism which helps shape the religion clauses.
39 Peter Gabel, Al Freeman and Betty Mensch and Gary Pellet-, in a series of articles about
"creationism," attack the sterility of liberal thought and its emphasis on positivist science. TIKKUN,
Nov.—Dec. 1987, at 55-76. Stanley Fish, in a mischievous article, uses Stephen Carter's critique of
traditional law and religion jurisprudence to "prove" that there is no such thing as liberalism. See
Stephen Carter, Evolution, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L. J. 977;
Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE L. J. 997.
4() Michael W. McConnell and Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious
Freedom, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1989). The authors contend that liberal theory in the area is
inefficient and insists that an economic analysis will resolve all the problems of the current
"murky" doctrine.
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writers who accept the fundamentalist world view" is even broader and
deeper than that of the "new wave" theorists. They argue, like the
traditional accommodationists and the new wave critics, that there is
no such thing as neutrality in matters pertaining to religion. 42 They go
further, however, by arguing that this non-neutrality—which includes
an emphasis on rational thought to the detriment of religious belie-
166s in and of itself a religion: the religion of secular humanism. 43
Despite their very different political perspectives, most of these
critics share some similar themes. They attack the sterility of liberal
thought and its emphasis on autonomy and argue that it ignores the
deep-seated place religion plays in many people's lives. Additionally,
they argue that it is both impossible and undesirable to separate relig-
ious dialogue from political decision making. In the next sections of
this Article, I will examine an article by Alan Freeman and Betty
Mensch, which explores several of these themes.
B. The Freeman/Mensch Article
Alan Freeman and Elizabeth Mensch's article, The Politics of Virtue:
Animals, Theology and Abortion," is a remarkably sophisticated and
provocative examination of the role of moral dialogue in American
theology and politics since World War II. It is worth reading for its rich
historical and philosophical summary of this topic alone. More spe-
41 The most prominent are David Stnolin, Wendell Bird and John Whitehead. See, e.g,, David
M. Srnolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in Postmodern America: A Response to
Professor Perry, 76 lowA L. REV. 1067 (1991) [hereinafter Smolin, Postmodern America]; David M.
Smolin, The Enforcement of Natural Law By the State: A Response to Professor Calhoun 16 DAYTON
L. Ray. 381 (1991) [hereinafter Smolin, Natural Law]; David M. Smolin, The Judeo-Christian
Tradition and Self-Censorship in Legal Discourse, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345 (1988) [hereinafter
Smolin, Self-Censorship]; Wendell R. Bird, Freedom From Establishment and Unnentrality in Public
School Instruction and Religious School Regulation, 2 HARV. J. L. & Putt. POL'v 125 (1979); John
W. Whitehead, Civil Disobedience and Operation Rescue: A Historical and Theoretical Analysis, 48
WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 77 (1991) [hereinafter Whitehead, Operation Rescue]; John W. Whitehead,
Avoiding Religious Apartheid: Affording Equal Treatment for Student-Initiated Religious Expression
in Public School, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 229 (1989) [hereinafter Whitehead, Religious Apartheid]; John
Whitehead and John Conland, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its First
Amendment Implications, 10 Tax. TECH, L. REV. 1 (1978).
42 See generally Smolin, Self Censorship, supra note 41 at 346.
43 This religion, they argue, is established in many areas of public life, such as public schools,
and thus constitutes an Establishment Clause violation. It most either be balanced with the
fundamentalist viewpoint or eliminated entirely. Although this viewpoint has attracted attention
in the popular press, and is an important part of fundamentalist theology, it has received short
shrift in academic literature. Only a few judges accept their arguments—and the most promi-
nent—Judge Hand in Alabama—has received widespread criticism for doing so.
44 Alan Freeman & Elisabeth Mensch, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology, and Abortion,
25 GA. L. REV. 923 (1991) [hereinafter Freeman and Mensch, Abortion].
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cifically, Freeman and Mensch discuss the role of moral discourse in
the context of the controversy about abortion.45 Although the article
has a number of corollary themes, including a fascinating discussion
of the complex relationship between proponents of animal rights and
pro-life advocates, 46 its primary thesis is that "an almost entirely secular
version of the abortion debate triumphed, leading to the constitution-
alization of abortion rights under the rubric of privacy. Lost in the
process was the continuing possibility of a genuine and ongoing moral
debate about abortion. "47 Freeman and Mensch, who describe them-
selves as "identified with the left/liberal side of law and politics," 48 are
highly critical of this result and argue that moral dialogue about
abortion, and presumably other issues, is in fact highly desirable."
They contend that liberal thought with its emphasis on autonomy
represents "a celebration of self as the ultimate concern, the final
arbitration, the trump to all moral claim."5° Roe v. Wade5 ' is interpreted
"as inviting, or even encouraging, routine use of abortion for the
instrumental realization of self-interest." 52
In criticizing the emphasis on rights in Roe, Freeman and Mensch
also portray the pro-choice movement as dominated by "white, edu-
cated, middle-class women" 53 for whom "the libertarian emphasis on
°Abortion, perhaps more than any other subject, illustrates the close relationship between
family law and law and religion. Therefore, it is not surprising that both Freeman and Mensch,
writing in the area of law and religion, and Carl Schneider, writing in the area of family law, use
the subject as their primary topic. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. Abortion is also a
central topic of Mary Ann Glendon. See infra note 199.
Freeman and Mensch, Abortion, supra note 44, at 939-63. The authors note that most
animal right supporters are politically left, while most pro-life proponents are conservative. They
suggest that despite their differences, "those who advocate respect and reverence for life, animal
or fetal, may share, more than they realize, a moral and theological common ground." Id. at 940.
In an article specifically devoted to the topic of animal rights, the authors criticize the "arrogant
instrumentation" of Western culture, a theme they continue in the abortion article. Alan Freeman
and Betty Mensch, Scratching the Belly of the Beast, TIKKUN, Sept.—Oct. 1989, at 34,36.
47 Freeman and Mensch, Abortion, supra note 44, at 939.
48 Id. at 934. They describe themselves as "gropingly religious people," but "neither Catholic
nor fundamentalist." Id. at 934. The authors also describe their own personal history with
abortion. Id. at 933-4.
48 Id. at 1079-1138.
50 Id. at 1121.
51 4l0 U.S. 113 (1973).
52 Freeman and Mensch, Abortion, supra note 44, at 1121-22.
" Id. at 1123. The authors also compare the pro-choice emphasis on reproductive freedom
to that of a spoiled suburban teenager who expects to be fed, clothed and otherwise taken care
of, but becomes indignant at authoritarian interference with lifestyle choice." Id. at 1126. This
clearly hostile description serves as more evidence that the authors are not as "neutral" as they
purport to be and seems to parallel the frequent claim by many pro-lifers that women have
abortion purely for "convenience." Freeman and Mensch's depiction of contemporary liberals
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choice was consistent with experience."54 These elitist women, in Free-
man and Mensch's analysis, ignore the real needs of poor women, who
may be forced through economic coercion to seek abortions they do
not really want. The authors quote with obvious approval from K
McDaniel's feminist pro-life book:
If poverty is the reason a woman is terminating the pregnancy,
if in fact she wants the child but cannot afford to have it, she
is actually being coerced into an abortion. She does not, in
fact, have a choice at all. For many women, this is precisely
their perception of the situation; they go to abortion coun-
selors saying they "have no choice," they "have to" have an
abortion
This section of Freeman and Mensch's article seems to parallel
much of feminist thought, particularly cultural feminist thought."
Certainly the criticism of rights analysis and of unrestrained, selfish
autonomy are common themes. 51 But this similarity is ultimately
resembles Carl Schneider's caricature of "psychologic man." See infra notes 178-80 and accom-
panying text.
54 Freeman and Mensch, Abortion, supra note 44, at 1124. See also KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION
AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984) (similar description of the sociological and economic
differences in many pro-life and pro-choice supporters). For a sophisticated feminist explanation
of the reasons many lower class women oppose abortion, see ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT WING
WOMEN (1983).
55 Freeman and Mensch, Abortion, supra note 44, at 1125 (quoting K. MCDONNELL; NOT AN
EASY CHOICE: A FEMINIST RE-EXAMINES ABORTION 71 (1984)). Some feminist authors question
whether one can be a feminist and pro-life, See Kathy Pollitt, Everything's Up to Date in North
Dakota, TIKKUN, Jan.—Feb, 1990 at 57. Certainly the vast majority of women writing in the field
of feminist jurisprudence are pro-choice. See, e.g., Robin West, Forward: Taking Freedom Seriously,
104 FIARV. L. REV. 43,43-47,63-85 (1990); Suzan= Sherry, Women's Virtue, 63 Tut,. L. REV. 1591
(1989); Ruth Colker, Abortion and Dialogue, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1363 (1989); Frances Olsen, Com-
ment, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1989); MACKINNON, supra note 26; Wil-
liams, Gender Wars, supra note 26; Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV.
761 (1990). However, although I am also pro-choice, I am uncomfortable with any definition of
feminism that excludes views with whom one does not agree. The viewpoint that a feminist
pro-lifer is a "contradiction in terms" is similar to Catherine MacKinnon's denunciation of those
who do not share her views on pornography. See MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 198-205. This is
a position I find equally problematic despite my own agreement with MacKinnon's statements
about pornography.
56 Several pro-choice feminists authors have noted there is a potentially dangerous parallel
between the themes of cultural feminism and anti-abortion rhetoric. See Schroeder, supra note
20. This concern is well-founded, as Freeman and Mensch's article illustrates. Ironically, Joan
Williams, one of the leading critics of cultural feminism, advocates use of sonic of its themes as
a way to show that pro-choice women can be as moral and caring as their pro-life counterparts.
Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 26 at 1589-94,
57 For critiques of an overemphasis on rights and autonomy, see Bender, Lawyers' Printer,
supra note 24 and Littleton, supra note 24, Most feminist jurisprudence is ambivalent toward
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superficial—the actual approaches taken by feminists emphasizing
these themes differ significantly from those advanced in Freeman
and Mensch's work. In order to portray the choice movement as
dominated by elitist rights-obsessed white middle-class women, Free-
man and Mensch inexplicably overlook the fact that a number of
prominent pro-choice feminists are also sharply critical of Roe's
"right of privacy" analysis." These feminist authors argue that the
correct way of looking at the issue is through equal protection
theory, a possibility Freeman and Mensch choose to ignore. At no
place in their article, which appears in a feminist jurisprudence
symposium,59
 do the authors seriously confront the fact that abor-
tion regulations will have a disproportionate impact on women.°
They may argue that this fact is too obvious to be mentioned,
but their "gender neutral" approach contrasts sharply with cultural
feminist theory, which is explicitly woman-centered," recognizing
that "the woman question" cannot be ignored. 62 In this aspect alone,
Freeman and Mensch's work differs from much of feminist jurispru-
dence, which has as one of its primary objectives an exploration of
the way women's situations are different from men's."
The fact that many poor women may be economically coerced into
an unwanted abortion is a very real problem and one which does
concern many feminists. However, despite their denials and claims
rights analysis, recognizing its limitations, but refusing to repudiate it entirely. See West, supra
note 14, at 55.
58 See, e.g., Colker, supra note 55; MARY A. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN
Law 50-52 (1987); Frances Olsen, Comment, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105
(1989); MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 93, 97; Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 26, at 1572-94.
For a criticism of the feminist critique of privacy, see Laura W. Stein, Living With the Risk of
Backfire: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of Privacy and Equality, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1153 (1993).
59 The article appears in Volume 24, Issue 4 of the GA. L. REV., an issue which is entitled
"Feminist Jurisprudence Symposium." Most of the article is concerned with a history of theology
and it only briefly touches upon feminist theory. In this area, the authors' primary goal is to
challenge the concept "that the only correct 'feminist' position is unswerving support for Roe v.
Wade" Freeman and Mensch, supra note 45, at 934.
66 The authors do attempt a feminist analysis in a section entitled "Women, Nature and
Nazis." Id. at 953-86. However, the section never considers the equal protection analysis and
emphasizes the view of pro-life feminists. Id. at 956-57.
61 See, e.g., Bender, Lawyers' Primer, supra note 24, at 3; West, supra note 14.
62 See Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 837 (1990)
("Feminists across many disciplines regularly ask a question—a set of questions, really—known
as 'the woman question,' which is designed to identify the gender implications of rules and
practices which might otherwise appear to be neutral or objective.")
63 See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections
on Feminism Unmodified, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 352, 353 (book review) ("[t] he purpose and practice
of feminist theory is to name, expose, and eliminate the unequal position of women in society.").
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of neutrality,84
 I believe that Freeman and Mensch's article can and
should be read as an endorsement of some form of state restriction of
abortion." Freeman and Mensch would apparently tell poor women,
"because you have no real choice, in a meaningful sense of the word,
for your own good we want to keep you from exercising that 'false
choice. —
This highly abstract approach to the problems faced by poor
women is a sharp contrast to the pragmatism found in much of femi-
nist jurisprudence." As Margaret Radin explains ". . . it seems there
are two ways to think about justice. One is to think about justice to an
ideal world, the best world that we can now conceive. The other is to
think about nonideal justice: given where we now find ourselves, what
is the better decision?" 67
 Freeman and Mensch refuse to come to grips
with the fact that a woman faced with an unwanted pregnancy in a
nonideal world is forced into pragmatism—she must make a decision.
It is easy to decry the economic pressures that may force poor women
to seek abortions and to call for reform of an unjust economic system.
Much of cultural feminism, which one commentator describes as
"Marxism you can take home to Mother"" is devoted to this goal." But
realistically, these major economic changes are not likely to happen in
the near future. Instead, there is an emphasis on cutting benefits to
welfare mothers, a step which would place poor women bearing addi-
tional unwanted children in an even worse economic condition." It
may be true that it is wrong to exclude talk about morality from
dialogue about abortion, but it is far worse to exclude recognition of
64 At the onset of the article, Freeman anti Mensch state that their goal is not to advance
one side or the other in the abortion debate, but rather to explore whether we arc necessarily
stuck with the grim and destructive fact of moral incommensurability," Freeman and Mensch,
supra note 45, at 931. Throughout the article, the authors claim to criticize both sides, however
in terms of length and weight, their criticism is primarily aimed at the pro-choice side.
66 It is difficult to read the article any other way. The authors consistently talk about "death"
when they refer to abortion and portray the women who choose abortion as either forced by
economic necessity into a false choice, or as selfish persons overly concerned with autonomy. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., Margaret f. Raclin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990);
Bartlett, supra note 62, at 849-63.
67 Radin, supra note 66, at 1700.
68 Williams, Deconstructing, supra note 26, al 820.
69 See, e.g., Bender, Gender Differences, supra note 20, at 34-36; Nancy Dowd, Work and Family:
The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace,
24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (1989).
"For descriptions and analysis of these attacks on welfare mothers, sec Maxine Baca Zinn,
Family, Race, and Poverty in the Eighties, 14 SIGNS 856 (1989) and Martha L. Fineman, Images of
Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L. J. 274.
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the necessity for tough pragmatic decisions from the dialogue, as
Freeman and Mensch have done.
The authors' approach also fails to achieve the empathy of cul-
tural feminism. Lynne Henderson describes empathy as embodying
three basic phenomena: "(1) feeling the emotion of another; (2)
understanding the experience or situation of another, both affectively
and cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself to be in the
position of the other; and (3) action brought about by experiencing
the distress of another .. . ."7I Although Freeman and Mensch accuse
rights-based theorists of lacking empathy for "the moral and social
experience of many women," 72 their one-sided perspective ultimately
represents their own failure of understanding. According to their arti-
cle, women who have abortions are either economic victims or driven
by "an internalized feminist pressure to be successfully autonomous
and independent."" There are no voices of women who have had
abortions and regard it as the right choice for them."
In contrast, in her article Feminism, Theology and Abortion: Toward
Love, Compassion and Wisdom, feminist Ruth Colker demonstrates an
ability to hear a variety of voices. 75 Like Freeman and Mensch, she is
critical of the failure of some pro-choice feminists to recognize that
the decision to have an abortion can be very difficult and traumatic. 76
71 Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Micit, L. Rev. 1574,1579 (1987). Hender-
son might object to her work being described as an example of cultural feminism, because she
explicitly rejects the argument that women are naturally more empathetic than men. Id. at
1582-83. My use of her work, however, is not necessarily to try to fit Henderson into a "category"
of feminist jurisprudence, because there is no agreement as to who belongs where among
feminists. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 20, at 121 (classifying Mary Joe Frug as a cultural
feminist vs. Frug's description of herself as a postmodernist): Frug, Manifesto, supra note 26.
Regardless of the label, I believe it is accurate to say that the works most commonly known as
cultural feminist do emphasize empathy,
72 Freeman and Mensch, Abortion, supra note 44, at 1123.
75 Id. at 1125. This language strikes me as displaying a curious hostility toward feminism. It
could have been written by Phyllis Schlafly.
"Although I have carefully read this article many times, I have not been able to find any
language which can be read as expressing empathy for women who choose abortion, other than
the section depicting them as victims of economic necessity. See supra notes 54-55 and accompa-
nying text. Indeed, even when describing their own experiences with abortion, the authors use
negative, derogatory language, stating their abortion history "is one of almost perfect irrespon-
sibility, of the kind that absolutely precludes self-righteousness." Freeman and Mensch, Abortion,
supra note 44, at 933.
75 77 CAI.. L. Rev. 1011 (1989). The author has recently published a book on the subject of
abortion. RUTH COLKER, ABORTION AND DIALOGUE: PRO-CHOICE, PRO-LIFE, AND AMERICAN LAW
(1992). Because I did not have access to this book at the time I was writing this article, my
discussions and cites will refer to her law review article. However, the position the author takes
in the book is similar to those in the article.
76 Colker, supra note 55, at 1046.
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Calker discusses with sympathy a pro-life book "Silent No More" 77 and
its stories of women who have come to regret their abortion decisions, 78
but notes that its author "chooses voices selectively. He only provides
us with stories of women who claim they were wrong to choose abor-
tion. He gives us little insight into how and why they changed their
minds, making it difficult for us to assess whether the change was the
result of reflection." 7° Colker, unlike Freeman and Mensch, attempts a
deeper understanding of why women may choose abortion and then
regret the decision. She recognizes that both the decision to have an
abortion in the first place and the subsequent regret can be shaped by
outside forces: "Mil both cases, the woman appeared to rely on a
dominating culture or an other—a parent, boyfriend, social worker, or
later, the Church."8° Colker's empathetic discussion of women's deci-
sions avoids judgmental statements like "[t]o abort a fetus is to kill, to
prevent the realization of a human being."' She understands that
many women "do not bear a child now in order to bear a child later.
It is because of their love and concern for the value of potential fetal
life that they choose to defer child birth."82
Colker, like Freeman and Mensch, is critical of much of liberal
pro-choice theory and argues that theology deserves a place in dia-
logue about women's issues," but her cultural feminist approach"
differs from their analysis in several significant respects. In addition to
displaying greater understanding of the real stories of women choosing
to have an abortion, 85 she is more willing to articulate her own positions
77 DAVID REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN: SILENT NO MORE (1987).
78 Colker, supra note 55, at 1063-67.
7`J
	 at 1065.
" Id. at 1066. Colker argues that by relying on the opinion of others and the dominant
culture, a woman fails to recognize her authentic self
"I Freeman and Mensch, Abortion, supra note 44, at 1137.
"Colker, supra note 55, at 1059,
Bs Id. at 1017. Colker argues that theological dialogue would benefit feminism generally
because it would provide an aspirational dimension that current feminist theory lacks. Id. at
1017-30.
84 Again, I feel compelled to offer the caveat I have made elsewhere—I am not necessarily
classifying Ruth Colker as a cultural feminist. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 21, at 837 n.128 (distin-
guishing Colker from Robin West, whom she describes as believing that women have a native
essence). I am arguing that her approach to the abortion issue embodies many aspects of cultural
feminism. For an argument that relational feminism cannot. be  effectively used to support a
pro-choice position, see Pamela S. Karlan and Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational
Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 858 (1993).
Colker discusses the actual women involved in Roe v. Wade and Doe u Bolton. Colker, supra
note 55, at 1050-54 (noting that the woman in Roe was pregnant allegedly as the result of a rape,
and the woman in Doe had already lost two children to foster care and had been a patient in a
mental hospital).
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on laws regulating abortion" and to offer pragmatic solutions. Instead
of just bemoaning the fact that some women may be coerced into .
abortions they may later regret, Colker suggests that states require that
group counseling sessions be available to all pregnant women 87 and
that the state should bear the cost of these programs." Colker also
recognizes the obvious fact that Freeman and Mensch ignore—that
abortion regulation will impact almost exclusively on women"— and
provides an equal protection analysis of abortion legislation."
Although Freeman and Mensch, and Colker share similar themes
and even use many of the same words ("love," "compassion," "theol-
ogy," "aspirations"), Colker's message of pragmatic empathy" for
women faced with an unwanted pregnancy and her aspirational goals
for all women contrasts sharply with Freeman and Mensch's empty
abstract theorizing.
Freeman and Mensch's work also lacks empathy for supporters of
the pro-choice position. While it is true that many of the leaders of the
pro-choice movement are white, middle-class women, I think it is
debatable whether the movement actually lacks concern for the poor.
I reached adolescence and young adulthood at a time when abortion
was illegal in most states, yet when my white, middle-class college
roommate92
 wanted an abortion, she had little trouble obtaining one.
When I first became aware of the extreme controversy surrounding
abortion, I couldn't really understand what everyone was so upset
about. I had regarded abortion law as being as ineffective as the
prohibition against sales of alcohol in my home town. 93 The fact is that
most white middle and upper class women were able to get abortions
"Calker states that she is pro-choice and opposed to criminalization of abortion. Colker,
supra note 55, at 1046-49. In contrast, Freeman and Mensch continually deny their own pro-life
positions, insisting that they are not taking sides. See supra note 64-65 and accompanying text.
"Colker, supra note 55, at 1066-67. She suggests that the programs be run by trained
ethicists and be voluntary.
88 Id. at 1067.
"Colker notes that men have less incentive to take responsibility for birth control and argues
that criminalizing abortion "has virtually no effect on the male partner who should be forced to
bear more responsibility for the unwanted pregnancy." Id. at 1048-49.
90 Colker, supra note 55, at 1053-54.
91
 Colker notes that "[a] fundamental problem with the legislation in both Doe and Roe was
its failure to take account of the specific factual situations in which abortion decisions arise." Id.
at 1054. Freeman and Mensch's work suffers from a similar defect.
')2 To protect the privacy of the person whose experience I described, 1 would like to slate
that I had fourteen different roommates during my four years of college, all of whom were white
and middle-class.
93 1 grew up in Knoxville, Tennessee, a city which banned the sale of alcoholic beverages until
1967.
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before Roe and they will continue to be able to get them if Roe is
overruled." As Freeman and Mensch recognize in an earlier part of
their article, abortion regulation primarily affects the poor, and thus
disproportionately women of color. 95
 It is highly unlikely that so many
middle-class women would mobiliZe against abortion regulation if self-
interest was their only motivation.
Freeman and Mensch's criticism of pro-choice women is specific
to the issue of abortion, but it is a sub-part of a major theme of all of
their work in the area of law andi-eligion. In their essay on fundamen-
talism and creationism,96
 as well as in the abortion article, the authors
characterize secular liberals as elitist snobs who are out of touch with
the lower classes° and patronizing or even contemptuous of religious
beliefs they do not understand. 98
 This is an attack carefully designed
to strike at the hearts of leftist intellectuals, who are self-consciously
aware of their privileged status and who feel overwhelming guilt when
confronted with an accusation that they are not sufficiently conscious
of class issues. There is much truth to Freeman and Mensch's criticism,
particularly their characterization of the attitude much of the press and
academia have toward fundamentalists, but the snobbery they describe
is hardly limited to liberals. I teach in a law school in which approxi-
mately 10% of the students are fundamentalists, many of whom tell me
they are afraid to express their beliefs in class, because of their fears
of peer disapproval. This disapproval is not the scorn of "politically
correct" leftists,99
 who are not exactly dominant among the student
94
 For a similar conclusion, see Marion Hart, Keeping Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1992, § 6
(Magazine), at 12. In an article describing her experience as a teenager pregnant in China, forced
to fly to New York for her abortion, she wrote;
My experience in China illuminates the tragic bottom line of this issue. Even if the
Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade and abortion is criminalized in the United
States, women who are wealthy enough to live above the law will always have a
choice. If I found myself in similar circumstances again, I could afford to take
another international flight. Others would not have that option.
Id. at 12. Every media account I have ever read about Roe's potential demise states that there will
be states in which abortion will remain legal.
95
 Freeman and Mensch, Abortion, supra note 44, at 932-33. The authors do not sufficiently
develop this important theme in other sections of their articles,
96
 Freeman and Mensch, Religion As Science, supra note 34.
97 See Freeman and Mensch, Abortion, supra note 44, at 1131-32.
98 Freeman and Mensch, Religion As Science, supra note 34, at 68. The authors state that "few
[fundamentalists] . fit the caricature of the ignorant, redneck buffoon, out of touch with the
modern world." Id.
991 deliberately put this term in quotes, because I am convinced that the entire concept of
"political correctness" is a public relations ploy created by the far right as a means of silencing
anyone who challenges the supremacy of white male thought and raises race and gender issues.
See Randall Kennedy, The Political Correctness Scare, 37 Lov. L. REV. 231 (1991); Mark V. Tushnet,
Political Correctness, The Law, and the Legal Academy, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 127 (1992).
16	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 35:1
body at the University of Tulsa, but the clearly classist disdain of
apolitical, economically privileged students toward members of relig-
ions identified as "hicky."'"
The fact that fundamentalists are often the victims of class snob-
bery, however, does not remove the reality that many of their absolutely
held beliefs are deeply sexist,'" racist,'" and homophobic.'" Leftist
intellectuals should be on guard against insensitivity to class issues, but
the solution to this important concern is not an over romanticized
celebration of every "working class" attitude.'"
Not only are liberals and other intellectuals elitist, according to
Freeman and Mensch, they are also essentialists.'" In their opinion,
people who insist on a secular world view "universalize one's own
physical or temporal moment, and then project its understanding
across space, or time, accordingly."'" But from my own admittedly
skeptical, somewhat secular, viewpoint, these words apply even more
powerfully to religious beliefs. To non-believers in any given religion,
that religion's religious beliefs are surely the epitome of mortals uni-
versalizing their own physical reality and projecting it across space.
Statements like "all men are born in original sin"'" are the quintessen-
tial form of essentialism and I could not possibly invent a better
example of arrogant universalism and Eurocentrism than the blond,
Aryan Jesus that appears in countless religious paintings.'"
100 Similarly, 1 am amused at watching the white male business and cultural leaders of Tulsa
go to great lengths to separate the city from its association with Oral Roberts, whom they regard
as an embarrassment to the image they would like to project.
101 Consider this statement by Pat Robertson, a fundamentalist evangelist, describing the
proposed equal rights amendment, "jilt is about a socialist, anti-family political movement that
encourages women to leave their husbands, kill their children, practice witchcraft, destroy capi-
talism and become lesbians." Overheard, NEWSWEEK, September 7, 1992, at 15.
192 See Mayer G. Freed and Daniel D. Polsby, Race, Religion and Public Policy: Bob Jones
University v. United States, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Dee-Ana Bardette and Nancy Parker, Bob Jones
University v. United States: Paying the Price of Prejudice - Loss of Tax Exempt Status, 35 MERCER L.
REV. 937 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
"See generally Gays Under Fire, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1992, at 34. The article states, "Iflor
fundamentalists, the anti-gay animus is rooted in Biblical injunctions against same sex unions.
Corinthians promises that homosexuals (along with fornicators, idolaters, adulterers and thieves)
shall never inherit the Kingdom of God." Id. at 37.
1 °4 A classic example is the Revolutionary Communist Party, which purports to represent the
working class and describes homosexuality as "a product of petty bourgeois ideology." Ed Kurt,
How Far Has the RCP Come?, THE GUARDIAN, May 20, 1992, at 2 (letter to the editor).
105 Freeman and Mensch, Abortion, supra note 44 at 1131-33. Calling one's opponent essen-
tialist appears to be the latest trump card in legal academia. See infra notes 243-47 and accom-
panying text.
1 °6 Id. at 1132.
1 °7 Romans 5:12:21 (King James).
108 See, e.g., BARBARA BURR, THE LIFE OF CHRIST: IMAGES FROM THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM
OF ART (1989).
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Because we are human, none of us can completely escape essen-
tialism. We all begin with our own experience when we try to formulate
principles and rules which will apply to others. With this under-
standing, we can at least argue with other secular essentialists who
emphasize (or overemphasize) "rational" dialogue yet recognize that
others' experiences may differ from their own. But how is it possible
to meaningfully argue with "God?" Religious fundamentalism is irre-
buttable on its own terms.'"g This type of essentialism is very different
and far more dangerous than the sometimes overly broad generaliza-
tions made by difference and radical feminists.m Most white, hetero-
sexual feminists, when confronted with explanations of the ways in
which the experiences of women of color or lesbians differ from their
own, will welcome these additional insights.'" Religious essentialists
refuse to consider the possibility of any truth but their own." 2 It is
impossible to exaggerate the danger of this form of essentialism. Con-
sider the chilling prediction of David Smolin, one of the evangelical
Christians romanticized by Freeman and Mensch as a victim of elit-
ism: 113
The disappearing middle and the stark contrast between loy-
alty to autonomy and loyalty to God's fixed moral code means
that it is impossible to promise a society in which all will be
comfortable. There will be no ultimate middle ground, no
place of comfort and concord in which the traditional theo-
rist and modernist liberal can live in equal comfort. One can
offer the losers of this conflict the comfort of some minimum
protections; one cannot offer the losers the vision of a society
that will permit and sanction their ways of life. The losers will
"See generally Smolin, Postmodern America, supra note 41.
11°For a discussion of the problem of essentialism in feminist jurisprudence, see infra notes
243-47 and accompanying text.
1 19 See, e.g., Bender, Gentler Difference, supra note 14, at 26 ("The criticisms of white Eurocen-
tric heterosexist feminist thinking from African-American, Latin-American, Native American,
Asian-American women, third world women, and lesbians, among others, were well-placed and
have been taken to heart by most of those criticized.").
112 1aor a thorough discussion of' "inerrant" religion, as opposed to dialogic religion, see
Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause, 67 IND. L.J. 1 (1991).
113 Freeman and Mensch, Religion as Science, supra note 34, at 70-71. Freeman and Mensch
do acknowledge the dangers of fundamentalism at the end of the article, stating that the Nazi
regime grew out of a "yearning for community and for moral significance," and arguing "[olur
task now is to recognize and hold in check the potential for fascism created by a similar alienation
in our own culture, as it is experienced by fundamentalists who feel disaffected by America's
orthodoxy of secularism." Id. at 71. The problem with these disclaimers is that they are too little
and potentially too late.
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live in a society that is hostile to the continuance of their ways
of life, even if force is not literally used to destroy them."4
Smolin makes it very clear elsewhere in his work that if his side wins,
the "losers" will include all gays and lesbians 15 and all women who
do not accept the Biblical view of women as subservient to men. 116
C. Separation of "Morality" and Legal Discourse
Freeman and Mensch argue fervently that "moral dialogue" does
belong in discussion about abortion, or any other issue which raises
complex political, religious, social and philosophical questions." 7 Most
cultural feminists would agree that purely "logical," "neutral," "objec-
tive" language is not the only way to approach a problem."
It is true that it is virtually impossible and probably undesirable to
separate talk about "morality" (or unselfishness, or cooperative behav-
ior) from our dialogue about the law. But the critical flaw in Freeman
and Mensch's works is that they are content to let their inquiry stop
there. The real question is not whether the government can attempt to
create "moral" (unselfish, cooperative, etc.) behavior through its legal
system, but when it is appropriate for the government to do so. Free-
man and Mensch betray their own lack of analysis on this issue by
asking whether Laurence Tribe, whom they characterize as opposing
moral self-sacrifice in the case of abortion, would also oppose "eco-
nomic regulation demanding self-sacrifice for moral purposes . . . .""
1 "Smolin, Postmodern America, supra note 41, at 1097.
" 5 Id. at 1094.
116 Id. at 1078 n.52, 1094-95 & n.121. While Smolin's criticism of feminism is not as hostile
as his criticism of gays and lesbians, his underlying contempt is obvious. He also distorts the
position of Ruth Calker (supra note 55), by citing her out of context with regard to her criticism
of the failure of feminists to take theology seriously.
117 Freeman and Mensch, Abortion, supra note 44, at 1131-38. This theme is very popular in
the current legal literature. Mark Tushnet, Religion in Politics, 89 Cotum. L. REV. 1131 (1989)
(book review); Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARv. L. REv.
2061 (1992) (book review); GREENAWALT, supra note 12; PERRY, supra note 12; SMOLIN, supra
note 41.
118 One of the inspirations for cultural feminism is Carol Gilligan's work on the difference
between "feminine" and "masculine" approaches to problem-solving. GILLIGAN, supra note 22.
Her famous example of Jake and Amy contrasts a strictly logical hierarchial approach to a
problem to a more contextual approach. The rejection of "neutrality" and "objectivity" is a central
theme of cultural feminists, who recognize that these concepts are only disguises for the viewpoint
of middle-class white men, who regard their own experiences as universal. See, e.g., Lucinda M.
Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning,
64 NoThE DAME L. REv. 886 (1989); Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Hmtv. L.
REV. 10,38-45 (1987); Bartlett, supra note 62, at 877; Bender, Gender Difference, supra note 20,
at 17-20.
119 Freeman and Mensch, Abortion, supra note 44, at 1122.
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They pose this rhetorical question knowing perfectly well the answer
is "no," both in the case of the actual Laurence Tribe the person, and
Laurence Tribe, the symbol of liberalism. Their point is supposed to
be an indictment of the inconsistencies of liberalism,' 20 but there are
clear differences. First, in the special case of abortion, the government
mandated self-sacrifice is limited only to women. Second, and more
important, the decision about abortion touches upon a deeply intimate
part of a person's life and will have a continuing major impact on that
life.
No one is completely selfish or completely unselfish, and no one
is unselfish or selfish in exactly the same way at exactly the same time.
But most of us are more likely to exhibit unselfish "moral" behavior in
the most intimate, immediately personal areas of our lives. The num-
ber of people who would risk their lives to save their own child is far
greater than the number who would put themselves in peril to save a
stranger's child. We usually experience greater pleasure from altruistic
actions at a personal level than in the abstract and feel greater guilt if
we depart from our moral principles in our intimate relationships. This
is generally true even when the "unselfish" behavior we exhibit toward
people we love may not be necessary and may even injure people who
we do not know. I know without a doubt that it is more important and
"moral" for me to give to Oxfam than to keep my middle-class daughter
well supplied with Barbie clothes, but the abstract need of unknown
children often seems easier to ignore. Therefore, the most appropriate
area for state action which mandates unselfishness and morality is on
the more remote economic level, in areas of our lives which will not
affect our very being. It probably is desirable for the state to mandate
my contribution to starving children, through taxes, because of my
own tendency to postpone or ignore my responsibility to unknown
others.' 2 '
120 Freeman and Mensch make a similar argument in Alan Freeman and Elizabeth Mensch,
The Public-Private Distinction in American Life and Law, 36 Bu• L. REv. 237 (1987). They claim
that ideals of privacy, usually used to protect personhood, can be also used to protect private
property, stating "Itlo assert privacy in the name of protecting our bodies against oppression is
still to assert the liberal world view. 'It's my body, keep others away.' 'It's my factory, keep the
angry local citizens out while ! close it down ... '." Id. at 256. This example illustrates the authors'
blindness to real world feminist concerns. Elsewhere in the same article, the authors explicitly
suggest that a woman's desire to be free from invasions of her body, in the form of rape or sexual
battery is just art expression of liberal alienation. Id at 254-56. This bizarre theory displays an
outrageous insensitivity to the objectification of women that dominates patriarchal culture. See
generally MACKINNON, SUPTa note 26, at 171-73.
' 2 ' The example I give is one in which I am in agreement with the "moral" purpose the law
strives to achieve, but do not always conform my beliefs with my actions. The case for government
action may be even stronger when a majority of people agree about the desirability of supporting
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Additionally, we should only accept "moral" decisionmaking which
affects the judges as well as the judged. 122 The truest test of moral
judgment comes when we realize the consequence of that judgment
will affect ourselves, not some stranger. This is particularly true, be-
cause being forced to accept moral judgments in which we do not
concur will usually be more painful when they affect the deepest, most
intimate aspects of our personal lives.
D. Conclusion
In summary, Freeman and Mensch raise four themes, each of
which appears to parallel cultural feminist thought:
(1) The authors call for a different type of dialogue about
complex legal and social issues and a rejection of purely
"objective," "neutral" thought;
(2) They reject selfish individualism, as exemplified by an
overemphasis on rights;
(3) They express concern about the lack of empathy for
economically disadvantaged women; and, as a corollary
(4) They offer an indictment of the elitism and essentialism
of liberal academics.
I have tried to develop four counter-themes, ways in which I think
their work is not like cultural feminism, or indeed any other type of
feminism:
(1) It is not explicitly woman-centered and therefore ig-
nores the way in which their proposals would disproportion-
ately impact women;
(2) It lacks the sense of "real world" empathy and pragma-
tism found in most feminist work;
(3) By overemphasizing the elitist contempt directed to-
ward conservative religious beliefs, it fails to consider the
inherently dangerous essentialism of these beliefs; and
(4) It fails to analyze the appropriate setting for state im-
plementation of moral goals.
hungry children, for example, but a significant minority of people actively oppose the "moral"
result. Uniform laws may be necessary to avoid the "free rider" problem.
14 It is a common feminist observation that if men could get pregnant, the freedom to choose
abortion would become one of our most closely protected rights.
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Ultimately, through their failure to consider explicitly the perspec-
tive of "outsiders" such as women, and gays and lesbians, Freeman and
Mensch's work becomes a validation of the power structure they claim
to oppose.
HI. ATTACKS ON THE LIBERAL VISION OF FAMILY LAW
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Prevailing Doctrine and Its Challengers
Family law is generally characterized as moving from a patriarchal
structure to a more egalitarian mode1. 1 " Thus, in the minds of many
liberals, it represents a story of women's progress, as exemplified by
the emergence of women's and children's rights within the familial
structure. Husband and wife are no longer "one," with the one being
the husband; 1 " the man is no longer the official head of the household
with absolute authority to control the family's property and finances 125
and to determine the family's domicile.' 26
 Prohibitions on interfamilial
lawsuits are generally abolished.' 27
 Courts and the police are more
willing to intervene in cases of family violence 128
 and in many states
spousal rape is now a crime. 129
The most significant change in family law has been the move from
a fault-based system of divorce, with an absolute rule that one party
12 ' See Stephen J. Morse, Family Law in Transition: From Traditional Families to Individual
Liberty, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 319 (V. Tufte and B. Myerhoff eds. 1979). For
viewpoints challenging the traditional version of family law, see Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History
and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1135; Minow, supra note 13; Olsen, supra note 13.
124 This statement is a paraphrase of Blackstone's famous description of the traditional
husband/wife relationship. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 432-45
(1822), Blackstone wrote: "[13]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in the law; that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least
is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband . . ." Id. at 442.
125 For a description of changes in marital property law, see K. CLARE, LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 288 (2d. ed. 1987).
126 This authority was so well established that if a wife refused to accept her husband's choice
of domicile, she was legally viewed as "deserting" the family. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Babbitt, 69 Ill.
277, 279 (1873).
127 see, e.g., Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 619-20 (Iowa 1979).
125 While much remains to be done in the area, there is no question that domestic violence
has received much greater attention in the past two decades and that protection for battered
women has increased. See, e.g., LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); WILLIAM A.
STACEY & ANSON D. SHOPE, THE FAMILY SECRET: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1983).
129 See, e.g., People v. Liberia, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020
(1985); Robin L. West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment,
42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990).
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must be at fault"' and rigid definitions of fault itself,' 31 to no-fault
divorce, which for all practical purposes makes divorce a unilateral,
autonomous decision of either party to a marriage."' Laws and policies
which constituted gender discrimination have largely been elimi-
nated' 33—alimony cannot be restricted to women,'" unwed fathers as
well as unwed mothers may have rights as parents. 135 The tender years
doctrine, the policy which automatically gave custody of children un-
der a certain age to the mother,'" has either been struck as gender
discrimination' 37 or abolished by state legislatures. 138
Most liberals applaud all these changes, as do some feminists, who
point to the tender years doctrine, for example, as reinforcing stereo-
types of women as solely maternal creatures, unfit for the rigors of the
marketplace. 139 The liberal model of the family is one of formal equality
13° See, e.g., DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay
eds., 1990); HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN
THE. UNITED STATES 30-79 (1988).
' s ' It was well accepted that there must be an innocent party and a "guilty" party in a divorce.
Therefore, under the strict fault-based logic, if both parties contributed to the demise of the
marriage, true fault could not be determined and the divorce could not be granted. See, e.g.,
Rankin v. Rankin, 124 A.2d 639, 644 (Pa. Super. Cr„. 1956).
152 See generally DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, Supra note 130.
'"This major change in family law is due to the Supreme Court's decision that gender based
discrimination triggers an intermediate level of review and must be justified by an important state
interest. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See generally Ruth B. Ginsburg, Gender and the
Constitution, 44 CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975).
154 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-83 (1979).
155 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); but see
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
'' See generally Mary Ann Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1, 20 (1990);
Ramsay L. Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335 (1982).
137 See, e.g., Ex Parte Devine, 398 So.2d 686, 695 (Ala. 1981); Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc.2d 178,
350 N.Y.S. 285 (1973); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119-20 (Utah 1986).
1 " Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed,
3 YALE L. & Pot.'v REV. 168, 170 (1984).
139 Mary Joe Frug argues that the doctrine "maternalizes the female body." Mary Joe Frug,
A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1061 (1992).
But see Ruth Colker, The Example of Lesbians: A Posthumous Reply to Professor Mary foe Frug, 105
HMV. L. REV. 1084, 1092, (1992) (arguing that the preference may help lesbian mothers). Many
feminists today advocate the substitution of the primary caretaker doctrine for the tender years
presumption. See, e.g., IVIAirruit, L. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 180-84 (1991); Frances Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 L. &
INF.Q. J. 1, 18-19 (1984); Barbara B. Woodhouse, 'Toward a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 TEx.
L. REV. 245, 289 (1990) (book review); Williams, Deconstructing, supra note 26, at 838-39. This
doctrine creates a presumption which would give custody to the child's primary caretaker, who
in many cases would be the mother. For a comprehensive discussion of the doctrine, see Laura
Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the Primary Caretaker Standard in Child
Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291 (1992).
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(with limited exceptions for children), 140 and the liberal vision is that
the family has become a partnership of individuals, instead of a male-
dominated dictatorship. All these changes, according to liberals, are
desirable, because they enhance equality for women and individual
freedom for everyone. This idyllic liberal view of modern family law is
challenged by two major critiques.
Many feminists have vigorously disputed the statement that
changes in family law are beneficial to woinen. 141 They point to numer-
ous studies which show that women's incomes generally decline after
a divorce, while men's standards of living improve. 142 Despite the fact
that women are usually the primary caretakers of children, 143 when
custody is contested, the husband has a better than average chance of
obtaining custody. 144 Martha L. Fineman, one of the most influential
feminists in the area, 143 argues that the changes in family law have
resulted in an "illusion of equality," but that "[t] he rhetoric of equality
is too easily appropriated and utilized to gain support for antifeminist
measures. "146
141} See MINOW, supra note 21, at 267-311 (1990) for a comprehensive discussion of children's
rights.
141 See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality Ideology, Contradiction and Social
Change, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 789; FINEMAN, supra note 139; Bartlett, supra note 24; Martha Minow,
Consider the Consequences, 84 MICH. L. REV. 900 (1986) (reviewing LENORE f. WEITZMAN, THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND
CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985)); Deborah L. Rhode and Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions,
Questioning the Reforms, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, SUpTa note 130, at 191-92;
Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 73 NEW ENG. L. REV.
437 (1988); MACKINNON, supra note 26; Woodhouse, supra note 139.
142 The most influential initial study is LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE. REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA
(1985). See also Heather R. Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L. Q 79,
97-98 (1986); James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for
Women and Children, 21 FAM. L. Q. 351, 352 (1987); Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial
Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 130.
143 Martha L, Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 769 & n.166 (1988).
144 See Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Mothers Are Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child
Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S Ehrs, L. REP, 235 (1982); see also Martha L. Fineman & Anne
Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determination at Divorce, 1987
Wis. L. REV. 107, 120. Many of these decisions giving custody to the father are based on extremely
gender-biased criteria, for example a mother's decision (usually forced by necessity) to work is
seen as detrimental to the child's best interest, while a father's is not. See Sack, supra note 139.
' 45 Patricia Cain describes Martha Fineman as a cultural feminist, who views women's rela-
tionships as socially constructed. Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L.
REV. 803, 835 n.122 (1990).
146 FiNEmAN, supra note 139, at 190.
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The second critique of family law,' 47 which is becoming increas-
ingly prevalent, draws on some of the arguments of the feminist cri-
tique,'" but has a different primary emphasis—the decline of "moral-
ity," connectedness, and unselfishness in family law. Many critics,
including Mary Ann Glendon,'" Elizabeth Scottm and Bruce Hafen, 151
assert that family law has become dominated by selfish individualism,
and a "waning of belonging,"152 to the detriment of human relation-
ships. Many of these commentators advocate specific changes to the
law, which would provide an "alternative story" 1 " emphasizing the
values of a "stable, interdependent, long-term relationship with a mari-
tal partner"'m and "a sense of responsibility to their offspring." 155
Criticism of an overemphasis on autonomy in family law appears
to coincide neatly with cultural feminism, which is characterized by its
critics as celebrating the "ideology of domesticity." 156 But the specific
I 47 The categories of schools of criticism of family law that I have identified are necessarily
generalizations. I have chosen not to discuss a third category of analysis, which is less prevalent,
but gaining in importance—an analysis explicitly and primarily based on law and economics. See
generally Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397 (1992); GARY
S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and QuasiRents;
Or; "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life", 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987). These economists often
sound conservative themes (e.g. Becker), but can also appear to be somewhat liberal, such as
Stake. In any event, their language generally differs sharply from most members of the "moral
school" of criticism, although one author, Elizabeth Scott, infra note 150, combines elements of
both moral and economic analysis. For a comprehensive discussion of the economic analysis of
family law regarding alimony, sec June Carbone and Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage:
Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TIJL. L. REv. 953 (1991).
148 Generally, these critics give a few obligatory footnotes to feminist authors, but do not use
them extensively in their work.
149 MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW (1989); MARY
ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987). One critic describes Glendon's
works as an "idiosyncratic blend of conservative convictions and radical feminist commentary."
Jane M. Cohen, Comparison-Shopping in the Marketplace of Rights, 98 YALE L. J. 1235, 1238 (1989).
See also Katherine T. Bartlett, Storytelling, 1987 Dora L. J. 760, 764 (book review) (describing
Glendon's programs as "decidedly conservative").
15° Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9
(1990).
151 Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging,
1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Hafen, Belonging]; Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity,
22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865 (1989) [hereinafter Hafen, Entity]; Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional
Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social Interest, 81
MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983) [hereinafter Hafen, Marriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy]. Hafen is
the most. openly conservative of the authors I discuss—he is explicitly critical of homosexual
tights, for example.
152 Hafen, Belonging, supra note 151 at 5.
153 Scutt, supra note 150, at 12-13.
154 Id. at 12.
"5 Id.
156 See infra notes 206-16 and accompanying text.
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proposals which emerge from this theme are often in fact detrimental
to women. For example, Elizabeth Scott's proposals, which are de-
signed to make divorce more difficult when minor children are in-
volved,157
 ignore economic and cultural disparities between men and
women, and would have a detrimental impact on most divorcing
women.'" So, once again, I am faced with the dilemma of seeing ideals
and language I support used in ways I find deeply troubling.' 59 Again,
however, I believe the problem is illusory, because despite the similari-
ties in rhetoric, the underlying goals and assumptions of many critics of
family law and cultural feminists are actually very different. I will begin
my discussion by examining a law review article which has proved highly
influential for the "moral value" school of family law commentators.' 6"
B. Carl Schneider and the Theme of Lost Morality in Family Law
In "Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family
Law,"'"' Carl Schneider proposes a basic theme: four forces shaping
family law have produced "a diminution of the law's discourse in moral
terms about the relations between family members" and the "transfer
of many moral decisions from the law to the people the law once
regulated." 162
 Unlike some of his later disciples,'" 3
 Schneider himself
purports to be a disinterested commentator, not a critic; he expressly
begins the article by stating he does not mean to imply that the law is
"less good" because it is less moral and by distancing himself from
commentators like Christopher Lasch who would like to return to "the
virtuous past." 1 "
1 J7 Scott, supra note 150, at 73-90. For an interesting proposal also designed to reduce
divorce when minor children are involved, see Judith T. Younger, Light Thoughts and Night
Thoughts on the American Family, 76 MINN. L. Rai'. 891 (1992).
159
 See Uncial Lacey, Mandatory Marriage For the Sake of the Children" A Feminist Reply to
Elizabeth Scott, 66 Tut.. L. REV. 1435 (1992). Among other things, Scott's proposals for a two year
waiting period prior to divorce would endanger battered women. Her proposal that the party
wanting out of the divorce must pay the other party a specified sum does not take into account
the differences between men and women's earning power. Her emphasis on pre-marital agree-
ments ignores the potential problem of unequal bargaining power between men and women.
159
 Katherine Bartlett has expressed similar concerns about Glendon's work. Bartlett, supra
note 149 at 764.
166 The author of this article is cited repeatedly by Hafen and Scott.
]61 Carl Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 M ten.
L. REV. 1803 (1985).
162 Id.
163
 Hafen and Scott, both of whom rely heavily upon Schneider, are openly critical of changes
in family law.
164
 Schneider, supra note 161, at 1808. Schneider states "I doubt that you can go home again
and even if you could, I doubt that you would enjoy it." Id.
26	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:1
Schneider begins with a summary of examples of his thesis, start-
ing with the most obvious and important—the move to no-fault di-
vorce, and the corresponding decline of discussion of moral factors,
such as adultery, in divorce cases. 165 He states that in the area of child
custody, "moral discourse has been reduced by the legislative and
judicial erosion as proper bases for decision of various issues of moral-
ity, particularly sexual morality, such as non-marital cohabitation and
homosexuality . . . .”"5
 His other examples of a reduced reliance on
moral dialogue in family law include laws governing non-marital rela-
tions"' and laws regulating sexual relations and reproduction." 8
The author then describes four broad phenomena which he iden-
tifies as the reasons for the trend to exclude moral dialogue from
family law: (1) the legal tradition of noninterference in the family; 1 9
(2) the tradition of liberal individualism;' 70 (3) society's changing
moral beliefs; 171
 and (4) the rise of psychologic man.' 72 Schneider
devotes most of his time to discussing his fourth identified phenome-
non—the rise of psychologic man. He paints a view of this man as a
person whose search for self-fulfillment comes before everything else.
165 Id. at 1809.
166 Id. at 1809-11. Schneider overstates his case. He relies upon a statement of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act which states that "RI he court shall not consider conduct of a proposed
custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child." Id. This statement, however, is simply
a proposed standard. Schneider does not discuss the considerable evidence that many judges do
use "immoral" behavior, especially homosexuality and adultery by the mother, as the major factor
in custody decisions. See Note, Custody: Lesbian Mothers in the Courts, 16 CoNz. L. Rev. 147 (1980);
Steve Susoeff, Assessing Children's Best Interests When A Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward A Rational
Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852 (1985).
Schneider also characterizes changes in alimony awards as an example of "diminished moral
discourse." Schneider, supra note 161, at 1810. He ignores other factors regarding changes in
alimony such as the Supreme Court's decision in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), and the fact
that alimony was never as prevalent as is commonly believed.
167 Schneider, supra note 161, at 1814-15. His primary example is the celebrated Marvin a.
Marvin palimony case. 18 Ca1.3d 660,557 P.2d 106,134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
168 Schneider, supra note 161, at 1817-18. In a late section of the article, Schneider uses
abortion and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as a "case in point" of his thesis.
169 Schneider, supra note 161, at 1835-39. Fran Olsen challenges the popularly-held state-
ment that in the past the state did not intervene in family relations. Frances C. Olsen, The Myth
of State Invention in Domestic Relations, 18 Mrcul. J.L. & REF. 835 (1985).
17" Schneider, supra note 161, at 1839-42. Schneider's basic thesis in this section is that John
Mill's principle that the state can only exercise power to prevent harm to others has been
incorporated into family law. Id. at 1839.
171 Id. at 1842-45. Schneider partially attributes the "sexual revolution" to "the waning
influence of Christianity among the relatively affluent, educated elite," a theme similar to Free-
man and Mensch's. Id. at 1843; see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. In this context, he
attributes the change in family law to members of the "legal elite" who "have more liberal attitudes
on family law questions than the mass public." Schneider, supra note 161, at 1821.
172 1d. at 1845-70.
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Instead of asking "is it right?" Schneider's psychologic man asks, "does
it work?" and behaves accordingly.'" Thus, all relationships and com-
mitments are seen as unimportant and disposable. The heart of
Schneider's picture of psychologic man, and indeed of his entire arti-
cle, is his statement that It] his view prefers temporary marriages,
temporary nonmarital arrangements, and temporary children . "174
Schneider describes the psychologic view as stating "you can't legislate
morality" when it comes to family law discussions.'"
Throughout his article, Schneider's style is almost Olympian with
its air of detachment. He positions himself as a mere observer of the
phenomena he describes, not an active participant in the debate. He
volunteers no information about himself, a sharp contrast to the highly
personalized style of Freeman and Mensch.' 76 This veneer of "neutral-
ity" is one of the most important ways in which Schneider's work differs
from that of cultural feminists, who explicitly write from a women's
perspective and reject the idea that anyone can be completely "objec-
tive" or neutral. They argue that the "objective" perspective is really
just the viewpoint of middle-class white men.'" The validity of this
17s
	 at 1848.
174 Id. at 1855.
175 Id. at 1862. Schneider also claims that "those most. enthralled by the psychologic attitude
seem the least interested in privacy, as we may it -tier from the phrase 'let it all hang out' .. • ."
Id, at 1850. Schneider's statement that psychological man does not desire traditional privacy is
not supported by any statistical evidence. Instead, in one of the most. transparent. examples of his
deliberate attempt to caricature others, he discusses a few instances of people appearing on Phil
Donahue to discuss personal private matters. He presents no evidence to indicate that the majority
of people engage in this behavior or that those who do so arc exclusively modernist liberals, as
Schneider apparently assumes. There are many examples of self-styled moral traditionalism, such
as jim and Tammy Bakker, who have also indulged in a great deal of public disclosure of their
persona] lives.
171;
	 and Mensch explicitly describe their own experience with abortion, for example.
Part of this difference may be chronological—the style of law review articles has changed dra-
matically from 1985 to 1992, but the real difference is philosophical, Although their work in many
ways increasingly differs from most critical legal scholars, Freeman and Mensch are still basically
"crits" and accept the concept of lack of neutrality and objectivity of the law. Their use of their
own stories helps enhance the idea that law is always viewed from someone's subjective perspec-
tive. Schneider, a traditionalist, would never concede this point.
177 Leslie Bender offers a definitive critique of people like Schneider:
It has never been satisfactorily explained how privileged men could escape their
locations and centers to view the world neutrally and objectively from some outside
Archimedean point. How are they so different from the rest of us, whose percep-
tions they challenge as biased and suspect because of our distinct locations and
identities .. . Limited male perspectives are masked, erased, or universalized
through techniques of objective, third person language and author invisibility, but
these techniques do riot make them less limited in fact.
Bender, Gender Difference, supra note 20, at 19. Schneider's lack of neutrality becomes more
obvious in his later works. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis and the Channelling
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argument is illustrated by Schneider's section on psychologic man, in
which his own animosity to the changes he describes and their advo-
cates become obvious. His carefully constructed "psychologic man" is
a caricature of a 60's hippie.'" At one point, Schneider describes his
psychologic man as having a tendency "to see the family as a collection
of individuals united temporarily for their mutual convenience and
armed with rights against the other." 179 This outrageous description
bears absolutely no resemblance to the way people really experience
their own families. 180 I know a lot of liberals, but I have yet to meet one
who actually regards his or her family as an armed camp of rights
bearers. I seriously doubt if Schneider has either.
Schneider is hardly a stupid or unobservant man; his rhetoric is a
very calculated attempt to place "modern" persons (such as feminists),
outside of the traditional vision of the warm, loving, caring family
circle. His deliberate misportrayal of less traditional families reflects a
failure of imagination and empathy, a blindness to the fact that those
who depart from the traditional patriarchal model can be just as
capable of self-sacrifice and love as Ozzie and Harriet Nelson. 18 ' Carrie
Function in Family Law, 55 Atm. L. REV. 669, 671, 676 (1992) (author validates the traditional
heterosexual view of marriage).
178 When he describes psychologic man, Schneider deliberately uses the tritest and most
self-indulgent phrases attributed by the media to the 60's counter culture. He describes his person
as saying let it all hang out," for example. Schneider, .supra note 161, at 1850.
178 Id. at 1859.
18°What Schneider has done is confUse an abstract viewpoint one may articulate as a
professor in a classroom with the actual experience the same person may have with his or her
family. Paul Finkelman, a law professor, offers an amusing but accurate response to this sort of
rhetoric in discussing a later paper by Schneider:
I doubt, however, the channelling function had any influence on our decision to
become parents. Did my wife and I calculate the tax advantages of a child? Did we
calculate that we should make sure the child would be born as late in December
as possible, but not after January 1st? Did we tell each other that we pay school
taxes, so we might as well take advantage of the money we are shelling out? I can
recall no such conversation, and I expect few others, except perhaps the occasional
tax professor, can recall them either.
Paul Finkelman, Family, Crime and Government Interests: Commentary on Schneider and Stith, 55
Alm. L. REV. 689, 690 (1992).
181 The Nelsons, a 1950's television family, with a working husband, a full-time mother (who
wore heels while washing dishes) and two clean-cut children are the traditionalists' view of the
ideal American family. These traditionalists ignore the statistics that show that only a minority of
families today fit this traditional nuclear model. In 1990, studies showed that as few as ten percent
of American families fit the traditional model. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's
In and Who's Out, 62 CoLo. L. REV. 269, 275-74 nn.18-2I (1991). The estimated number of
children being raised in lesbian and gay households is estimated at between 6 and 14 million.
Frederick W. Bozett, Gay Fathers: A Review of the Literature, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE FAMILY
(1989).
Further, it is at least questionable whether the conservatives' idealized "moral" family ever
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Costello has described traditional conservative attitudes toward fami-
lies as setting up a dichotomy between the "Order" and the "Other"
(e.g. racial minorities or gays and lesbians).'" She explains that:
The Order exalts its position by defining itself against the
Others who are definitionally debased. It interprets the inti-
mate relations of the Other as lascivious, promiscuous, and
sexually savage. Thus, the Order feels that the Other in ques-
tion is immoral and inferior, and that the Order's control is
therefore legitimate.'"
Schneider's article is clearly written from the perspective of a de-
fender of the Order.
Despite his disclaimers of neutrality, Schneider's overall theme
that moral dialogue has disappeared from family law implicitly suggests
that those who advocate changes in the area are immoral or at best
amoral. This approach differs sharply from that of cultural feminists,
who usually write from the perspective of the Other'" and recognize
that there are many alternative versions of "morality" and unselfish-
ness. Even if Schneider is accurate in stating that "in the psychologic
view, happiness comes from discovery and expressing one's unique
really existed. In the actual real life case of the Nelsons for example, Ricky Nelson, the quintes-
sential all-American boy, was divorced and a cocaine user at the time of his death. Ozzie Nelson
has been depicted as a manipulative overachiever who "expected his real-life sons to carry their
show images into daily life." Lynn Van Matre, Trapped as a Then-Age idol, Cm. nun., June 29,
1990, at 3 (reviewing Jou SEININ, RICKY NELSON: IDOL FOR A GENERATION (1990)).
182 Carrie G. Costello, Legitimate Bonds and Unnatural Unions: Race, Sexual Orientation and
Control of the American Family, 15 I1ARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 79, 80-86 (1992). Costello's article
describes in detail the methods used by the Order to control the tinnily structures of racial
minorities and gays and lesbians.
183 /d. at 85.
184 This statement might be disputed by Joan Williams, who creates a dichotomy between
outsider-scholars and "relational feminists." Williams, Postmodern, supra note 26, at 318-21,
Although she begins by limiting the category of outsider-scholars to racial minorities, in discussing
the work of Marie Ashe, a white feminist, Williams states that Ashe is more like an outsider-scholar
than a relational feminist. Id. at 321-22.
Williams' example raises the problem with classifying people as outsiders or insiders, because
the categories depend on one's perspective. It is true that in her criticism of the medical
establishment Ashe may be an outsider, but more centrally she is an insider with respect to her
chosen topic of reproduction, because she is able to conceive and bear children. Ashe's work,
which portrays childbirth as a mystical experience which creates the only meaningful bond
between mother and child, explicitly makes all infertile women outsiders, who can never be "real"
mothers like Ashe herself. Marie Ashe, Law-Language of Maternity: Discourse Holding Nature in
Contempt, 22 NEW ENC. L. Rev. 521, 556-59 (1988) (discussing non-gestational parents and stating
"Mhile such parenthoods never rise—separately or in coqiunction with each other—to the level
of maternity asserted by a woman whose body has actually constituted the child's developmental
process, each may . . . deserve some respect." (emphasis added)).
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true self,"'85 it is not necessarily true, as Schneider assumes, that this
"true self' is selfish and capable only of temporary relationships. As
Ruth Colker demonstrates, for many women a search for our "authen-
tic selves" can be one which will make us stronger and more capable
of selfless behavior. 186 A person's reluctance to force another into
completely binding arrangements does not necessarily mean that per-
son does not want permanent relationships. Consider Germaine
Greer's eloquent words:
Perhaps I am not old enough yet to promise that the self-re-
liant woman is always loved, that she cannot be lonely as long
as there are people in this world who need her joy and
strength, but certainly in my experience it has always been so.
Lovers who are free to go when they are restless always come
back; lovers who are free to change remain interesting. The
bitter animosity and obscenity of divorce is unknown where
individuals have not become Siamese twins. A lover who
comes to your bed of his own accord is more likely to sleep
with his arms around you all night than the one who has
nowhere else to go. 187
These are not the words of a woman who wants only disposable
relationships. Schneider also chooses to view the increased trend
toward premarital sex and cohabitation before marriage as a sign
of societal lack of commitment to permanence. An alternative view
is that people understand that compatibility is necessary for a suc-
cessful marriage and believe that premarital sex and cohabitation
give them an opportunity to decide whether the relationship has a
good chance of survival.
Unlike cultural feminists, Schneider ignores the complexity of
even the situations he chooses to describe. One of his examples of his
thesis that contemporary family law favors relativism and self-gratifica-
tion at the expense of moral dialogue is the case of Phillip B.' 88 Phillip
B was a 12 year old boy with Down's Syndrome who had been institu-
tionalized since birth.' 89 When his father refused to give permission for
186 Schneider, supra note 161, at 1849. I do not have the expertise in psychology to challenge
the essential accuracy of Schneider's statements about psychological theory, but their bias is quite
obvious to me and I would suggest that his portrayal of the discipline of psychology is at best
incomplete.
186 See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Politics of
Authenticity. (Review Essay) 68 B.U. L. REV. 217 (1988).
187 GERMAINE GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH 260 (1970).
188 Schneider, supra note 161, at 1816-17.
' 85 In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 800, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Cal. CL App. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
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heart surgery for the boy, the state sought a court order compelling
surgery, stating that without the operation Phillip's lungs would dete-
riorate and his life would be shortened.'" The California Appellate
Court declined to order the operation, relying upon parental auton-
omy as a justification.m
Schneider's story is carefully chosen to make his point. The reader
is clearly supposed to view Phillip B's parents as monstrous examples
of autonomy run amok—people who would let their mentally-retarded
son die to fulfill their desire for self-gratification. But this story is
incomplete in two ways. First, most actual litigated cases involving
parental refusal to order medical treatment for children involve the
parent's deeply held, sincere religious beliefs. 192 These cases do discuss
Schneider's lost morality and the correct "moral" resolution is not
clear.' 93 More importantly, Schneider's text simply leaves out the rest
of the real story of Phillip B,' 94 a story that Martha Minow, an advocate
of many of the viewpoints Schneider criticizes,' 95 tells us in full.'"
Minow's account, unlike Schneider's, is sensitive and complex. Despite
the impression Schneider would leave with his readers, Philip
Becker's 197 story did not end with the California Court's refusal to
order heart surgery. A family who had been become close to Phillipm
19° Id. at 799-800.
191 /d. at 804.
192 E.g.jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam), riffk
278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (three judge court); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338,292 A.2d 387
(1972); In re Sampson, 65 Misc.2d 658,517 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct. 1970). In a later section of
his article, Schneider, in stating that the "rights approach" to family law can be used to abuse
members of the family slates that "[t]his possibility is most grimly raised when parents refuse
lifesaving medical aid for their children." Schneider, supra note 161, at 1858-59. Schneider's
footnote refers the reader to his Phillip B discussion and to an argument by a doctor regarding
euthanasia. At no point in his article does he cite to or discuss the well-known and prevalent cases
regarding religious reasons for refusal of medical treatment.
1" See Judith Inglio Schneider, When Children Die As A Result of Religious Practices, 51 Ottio
ST. L.J. 1429 (1990).
19'Schneider does describe the actual resolution of the case of Phillip B, but only as a
follow-up sentence to the cite of the case in a footnote, Schneider, supra note 161, at 1817 n.52.
155 1 do not mean to imply that Schneider literally criticizes Minow's work specifically; he
does not. However, in The Free Exercise of Families, as well as in her other work, Martha Minow
advocates a recognition of less traditional family structures, a practice which Schneider does
explicitly criticize. Martha Minow, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: The Free Exercise of Families,
1991 U. It.t . L. REV. 925.
196 MINOW, supra note 21, at 341-49.
197 It is typical of the difference in their approaches that Martha Minow, unlike Schneider,
chooses to use the boy's actual name, instead of reducing him to an abstract case study.
195 The Heaths, a volunteer couple, had met Phillip while serving as volunteers at his
institution, and had brought him to their home for overnight visits and holidays. Id. at 341.
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instituted a suit asking for legal guardianship and eventually for cus-
tody of the boy.'
In the subsequent trial, the judge concluded that the Heaths had
become Phillip's psychological parents and gave them physical custody
of the boy,20° who eventually did have successful heart surgery.201 I n a
lengthy, emotional opinion, the judge departed from traditional legal
analysis by imagining "a platonic dialogue with the court posing the
choices to Phillip and Phillip's preferences being ascertained from the
more logical choice."202 He acknowledged that "judges are human and
not machines" and "that we prefer to be judged by a real person with
emotions and common sense," and expressed his personal "anguish
and parental grief.'" about Phillip's story.
Schneider's decision to analyze only the initial part of Phillip's
story and his emphasis on the formal aspects of the legal decision
illustrate how completely he misses the real message of cultural femi-
nism's theme of connection and empathy. Schneider would probably
condemn the trial court's opinion in Phillip Becker's custody case
because it lacks the rigid moral analysis he prefers, but the opinion
actually offers something much better: "an encouraging sense of a real
human being, struggling with his relationship to others in the face of
moral issues, and a disturbing sense of how thin is the veneer of laws
on a justice system of men. ,'204
The contrast between Schneider's and Minow's approaches to the
same story illustrates the difference between cultural feminists and
other types of commentators who call for a return to "morality" in
family law. Minow, like Schneider, is concerned about an overemphasis
on selfishness and autonomy, and places a high value on ideals of
caring and responsibility. Unlike Schneider, however, she recognizes
that we cannot draw easy lines between selfishness and unselfishness,
and "morality" and immorality. Because of his rigidity and inability to
understand any version of morality other than his own, Schneider sees
Phillip Becker's "case" as one of vindication for his theme that selfish-
ness reigns triumphant in modern family law. Minow sees Phillip
Becker's story as one of hope, of offering the possibility of transcend-
ing abstractions and dichotomies. She writes: "Let us tell the story of
199 Id. at 343 (citing Trial Court Opinion, at 2).
2°°The order did preserve the Rockers' rights as parents. See Guardianship of Phillip B., 139
Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781.
201 MINOW, supra note 21, at 346 n.120.
2°2 Id. at 345 (quoting Trial Court Opinion, at 16-17).
205 Id. at 347 (quoting Trial Court Opinion, at 18-19, 23 nn.68, 68a, 70).
2°4 Id. at 347.
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Phillip Becker when asked about medical treatment decisions for dis-
abled persons—and the chance of deepening our relationships to
judging and living , . . ."20r'
C. "Domesticity" and Cultural Feminism
Schneider's article, along with others in the "moral view" genre of
family law, appears to validate the major critics of difference feminism,
who argue that cultural feminists have established an ideology of "Do-
mesticity," which overemphasizes and romanticizes women's roles as
care-givers and nurturersP' This ideal, according to critics like Joan
Williams207 and Jeanne Schroeder, 208
 revives the Victorian stereotype of
women as belonging to a delicate, domestic sphere. 209
 Cultural femi-
nists, Williams argues, "celebrate a women's culture that encour-
ages women to 'choose' economic marginalization and celebrate that
choice as a badge of virtue."210
 Critics charge that women do not really
freely "choose" to abandon careers for child-raising. Instead, they are
forced to assume responsibility because (1) they have been brain-
washed into believing their actions are "moral" and "tinsel fish," 2 " (2)
men will not assume responsibility for domestic activities and someone
has to do it (using Karen Czapinsky's provocative analogy, women are
"draftees" as parents, men are volunteers 212) and (3) the workplace will
not make the necessary changes to accommodate workers who also
have parenting cluties. 2 "
"Id. at 349.
2wWilliams, Gender Woes, supra note 26, at 156(1. Williams reads Carol Gilligan's work,
GILLIGAN, supra note 22, as finding lino "'femininity' retains major components of the ideology
of domesticity." Gender Wan, supra note 26, at 1566. This argument. is not the only criticism of
cultural feminism. See infra notes 236-47 and accompanying text.
207 Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 26.
200 Schroeder, supra note 20.
2"The Victorian stereotype of women as delicate creatures who need to be regulated to a
private sphere is well documented. See, e.g., Welter, 'Hie Cult of True Womanhood, 18204860, 18
Am, Q. 151 (1966). The fear, however, that. we will return to Victorian limes strikes me as
unrealistic and over-exaggerated. The late 20th century version of capitalism and American
society differs so dramatically from the 19th century model that a return to Victorianism seems
extremely unlikely. In short, 1 think critics like Williams and Schroeder have erected a "straw
woman" (perhaps actually made out of gossamer) in their fears of Victorian imagery of women.
210 Williams, Deconstructing, supra note 26, at 801.
211 See, e.g., id. at 830.
212 Karen Czapinsky, Volunteers and Draftees: 'the Struggle. For Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 1415 (1991); see also ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & A. MAcituNG, Tin.: SECOND SHIFT: WORKING
PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989).
213 This argument, linked with a call for a massive restructuring of the workplace, is a major
theme of much of feminist jurisprudence, regardless of category. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Sex
Discrimination or Gender Inequality, 57 FoRminm L. Rxv. 941 (1989); Kathryn Abrams, Gender
34	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 (Vol. 35:1
All three of these arguments are valid and important, but in many
ways the critics of "domesticity" are just as essentialist as the cultural
feminists they assail. The viewpoint they present is incomplete and may
be just as dangerous to feminist goals as an exaggerated version of
"woman" as Earth Mother.21 " My first objection is to the label "The
Ideology of Domesticity" as applied to writers who argue that women
should value their nurturing skills and capacity to form cooperative
relationships. As a woman who believes these characteristics should be
affirmed and who has to some degree chosen to subordinate career
goals to parenting, I am both annoyed and amused at the idea that I
have become a member of a cult of "Domesticity. ""5 Try telling that to
my mother, who continues to show up at my house with a mop and
cleaning liquid and to make dire references to my Aunt Lou, who ac-
cording to our family folklore "lost" her husband because she wouldn't
dust the bookshelves.
Assertions that women do not really choose to assume parenting
responsibilities at some cost to their careers are highly problematic—
first, because they are simply wrong in many individual situations, and
second, as Kathryn Abrams has pointed out, because they may be a
strategic disaster, 216 because, they widen the gap between women who
work at home and those who work outside the home.
Critics of "domesticity" implicitly embrace work ethic standards
which make them overvalue participation in the marketplace. Al-
though she is a harsh critic of essentialism in difference feminism, Joan
Williams relies upon a number of essentialist assumptions about the
workplace. All jobs are simply not the same, in terms of structures and
rewards. 217 Williams' assertion that many women often have no real
Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. Rev. 1183 (1989); Nancy
E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARYL L. Rev. 431 (1990); Mary Joe
Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REV.
55 (1979).
214
	 of cultural feminism routinely describe the genre as reinforcing this stereotype.
Ironically, the only cultural feminist whose writing does unequivocally present the "Earth Mother"
image is Marie Ashe, supra notes 112,184, and infra note 246, whose work Joan Williams praises.
Williams, Postmodern, supra note 26, at 321-22.
215 Joan Williams explicitly denies that she is arguing that women who choose child-raising
over careers suffer from false consciousness. Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 26. Despite this
denial, Kathryn Abrams has compared Williams' critique of domesticity to false consciousness
claims. Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, supra note 55.
216 Abrams, supra note 55, at 761.
217 On the surface, Williams appears to acknowledge this, She also argues that "[cihoice
rhetoric clearly privileges the life patterns of the relatively affluent, predominantly white essential
woman who can choose against employment." Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 26, at 1610. This
is a very valid observation. I am riot convinced, however, that the solution is Williams' own
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choice regarding working versus taking care of the children is accurate
for many women in low-paying jobs, because adequate day care can be
more expensive than their salaries. But her statements are not so true
for many professional women. I have a hard time seeing the woman
lawyer who decides to become a permanent associate at a salary of
$80,000, as opposed to becoming a partner making $200,000 or more,
as a victim. 218 Even if her spouse"' will not assume his proportionate
share of child care responsibilities, 22" this woman has the economic
resources to hire a full-time, live-in care-giver. Her decision to forego
partnership is more likely to be based on a decision that the "rewards"
of partnership (more money than most people could possibly spend
or need, dubious "power" over decisions unlikely to affect the real
world in any significant way) are not worth succumbing to the pressure
to bill 80 hours a week and assume a posture of eternal deference to
senior partners.22 I Williams implicitly assumes that all work is interest-
ing and fulfilling: something any woman would want to do if she were
not forced to make a false choice for domesticity. 222 This assumption
both greatly exaggerates the joys of the workplace and underestimates
the genuine rewards of child-raising. 228
"and-choice' rhetoric, which in places often strikes me as being equally oblivious to class differ-
ences. I am also concerned that the theory of sonic feminists that women never really choose to
spend time child-raising will only worsen the trend to flute welfare mothers to "go to work." See
supra note 70. 1 think Williams is right when she says that thus for only relatively privileged white
women have the choice to remain home with their children, but 1 would prefer to see expanding
that choice to all women. As good day care becomes more expensive, it will increasingly make
sense for some women, those who really want to, to remain home with their children.
2111 This is not to say that I approve of the term "mommy track" which is commonly used to
describe this type of• ob or that I disagree with much of the criticism of the concept in its current
form. See Williams, Gender Wars ., supra note 26, at 1609-11. However, 1 think that it is desirable
for law firms to offer permanent associate alternatives to the excessive demands of partnership.
215 This statement assumes a conventional married heterosexual relationship, which is not
the only situation in which women are paren ts. See Costello, supra note 182. Most of the studies
Williams relies upon, however, are concerned exclusively with this type of relationship. I am not
aware of any study regarding allocation of child-care and other domestic responsibilities among
lesbian couples.
220
	 HoclisciuLD & MACI IUNG, supra note 212.
221 For a satirical description of a large law firm viewed from a woman's perspective, see
Sandra Lee Fenske, Through the Class Ceiling and What Alice Found There, WASH. 1.Aw., July/Aug.
1992, at 28.
222 Williams' central theme that women do not really "choose" to forgo the workplace for
child-raising resembles Freeman and Mensch's argument that lower class women do not really
"choose" abortion. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. I do not mean to suggest that
Williams would accept Freeman arid Mensch's viewpoint. Her own work on abortion makes it
clear she does not, but she does acknowledge that the rhetoric of "choice" in the abortion area
fuels a backlash.
223
 Williams consistently refers to women who decide to stay home with their children as
being self-sacrificing, and as giving up their jobs only because they feel the children need them.
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Williams' statements about the dangers of "sequencing" 224—taking
time off to raise children—may only be true for a limited number of
professional women who work in corporations or law firms. 225 They
should not be true for physicians, for example, 226 and almost certainly
are not true for the many women stuck in lower paying, non-profes-
sional "dead end" jobs. The idea that her "career opportunities" will
be hurt if she quits her job for a few years will sound silly to a woman
employed as a dishwasher.227 The argument that taking time away from
the workplace can permanently marginalize women is also undercut by
the number of people who make successful mid-life career changes. 228
None of this is to say that 1 disagree with the goal of restructuring
the workplace so that women can work full-time and be effective
parents. 229 1 regard the articulation of this goal and concrete sugges-
This motivation is undoubtedly one major reason mothers stay home, but an equally strong reason
may be the woman's sense that she needs her children, that spending time with them contributes
to her own personal happiness. Williams often overlooks the significance of her own stories. For
example, she quotes a woman who quit her job after hearing that she missed seeing her child
take his first step as saying, 1 realized that his first year had gone by so quickly, I had been like
a visitor in his life. I can always go back to work . . . . 1 can't always raise my child." Williams,
Gender Wars, supra note 26, at 1620-21. Williams characterizes this woman as "assum ling] that
the mature course of action is to choose marginalization." Id. at 1620. However, she presents no
evidence that the woman felt the child was riot being well cared for. A more likely explanation
is that the mother simply wanted to spend more time experiencing the joy and satisfaction of
watching her child grow older, an arguably "selfish" motive.
224 Williams, Deconstructing, supra note 26, at 827-28. Williams states that 'Where is growing
evidence that a career hiattts, at least in sonic professions, does not merely slow women down,
but places them permanently in a second class, relatively low-paid mommy track." Id at 828. She
also takes issue with the media examples of successful sequencers, such as Jeane Kirkpatrick,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Judge Patricia Wald, stating that these women are the exception
and that "most women would take years off their careers if they could be guaranteed that upon
their return they could become an ambassador to the United Nations, a Supreme Court Justice,
or a D.C. Circuit Court Judge ... ." Id. at 827-28. This argument obscures the fact that Kirkpa-
trick, O'Connor, and Wald had no such guarantee, they chose to take a risk that paid off.
225 Williams' examples oldie danger of sequencing are primarily limited to those professions.
22r The process of becoming a doctor is very long, and attempting to take time off in the
middle of this process might permanently affect a women's career development, especially in
light of the established fact that medical schools routinely engage in age discrimination in their
admissions process, (More than one commentator has suggested that Alvin Bakke's real grounds
for a lawsuit was age discrimination), However, due to the medical profession's continued vigi-
lance in limiting the number of doctors, a woman who has completed the process and received
all her training should be able to take time off with no real detriment.
227 If she is a member of a union, she may lose significant benefits, but otherwise there is
little evidence that time off for child-raising will hurt her career. 1 do not mean to be derogatory
to dishwashers, but simply to suggest that a lot of jobs do not offer much room for advancement.
229 The phenomenon of people who do choose to make career mid-life changes and are
successful is well documented. Williams does not really offer a satisfactory explanation as to how
this phenomenon ties in with her statements about sequencing.
229
 Certainly Williams, supra note 26, and Kathryn Abrams, supra note 55, do raise important
points about the fact that women usually do shoulder a disproportionate share of child care and
housekeeping responsibilities when both spouses work.
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tions as to how it can be accomplished as one of the most important
contributions of feminist scholarship."° But I also recognize that these
changes will not come quickly or easily in an era dominated by distrust.
of "government interference" with business, in a country where women
must struggle to pass very modest family leave provisions already in
place in almost every other industrialized county in the world."' I am
simply not convinced that validating women who make what are nec-
essarily imperfect choices in an imperfect world232 diminishes our work
toward major structural changes. 2" Indeed, I would suggest, on a
purely anecdotal basis, that some of the actual workplace victories are
brought about not by law professors attacking "domesticity, "234 but by
women who take their children to their offices, thus bringing about a
subtle but potentially revolutionary change in the atmosphere of many
workplaces, and from indispensable women employees whose decision
to work part-time because of inflexible rules force their employers to
rethink their policies.
IV. CONCLUSION: RESURRECTING THE MIMICKED THEMES AND
MIXED MESSAGES
Although criticism of liberal jurisprudence in law and religion,
and family law is often expressed in language about responsibility,
caring and connection, language which is also used by cultural femi-
nists, it often masks agendas which would work to the detriment of
250 See supra note 213 for a list of feminist works devoted to this objective.
"I See Bush Vetoes Bill Making Employers Give Family Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1992, at Al
(President Bush vetoed family leave hill). Senator Dodd has been quoted as saying that the United
States is the only industrialized nation without a job protection leave law. Senate Approves Family
Leave Bil4 TULSA WORLD, Aug. 12, 1992, at 132. This recently changed, however, as Congress
passed the Family Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993), in the early days of Clinton's
presidency. See Family Leave, SEATTLE Ttmcs, Feb. 10, 1993, at B5 (bill requires employers with
fifty or more employees to provide workers tip to twelve weeks of unpaid leave).
2"2 Williams also never explains what the alternatives arc for the woman faced with a "false
choice." Are they: (I) Do not have children, (2) Quit your job anyway, but do not feel good about
it or (3) Try to work full-time and have children, "juggling" both responsibilities. Option (1) and
(3) may be viable for a number of women; but option (2) seems incredibly negativist. I think the
woman who opts for quitting her job or part-time work does have much to celebrate and should
do so. Sometimes this choice is indeed forced, and one that will make her unhappy, but that is
not always the case.
2" In my more pessimistic moods, I predict that Derrick Bell's "interest converge" theory will
apply to workplace reform as well. See DERRICK BELI„ AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987). Male
employers will only change to the extent it serves their own interests to do so. Because many of
the woolen who will be powerful and articulate enough to make their demands heard will be
professional women, ultimately I'm afraid much of workplace reform, like too many other aspects
of the feminist movement, will end up benefitting primarily white middle-class women.
234 See supra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
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many women. Katherine Bartlett describes this problem in the work of
Mary Ann Glendon: "Whose of us who have been attracted to these
new themes and tools may well ask: Does Glendon's work mark a
failure or weakness of these ideas as tools of progressive reform?" 233
The concern expressed by Bartlett partially explains why cultural
feminism is increasingly coming under attack 236—the dangers of exces-
sive domesticity2"7 or excessive deference to "morality" and religion 2"
to women are all too obvious. The fact that cultural feminism has
dangerous aspects, however, does not warrant a wide-scale abandon-
ment of all of its insights. An overly broad and superficial reading of
Gilligan and some of her followers may lead some readers to the
conclusion that cultural feminists long for women to return to their
traditional roles. On the other hand, an overly broad reading of the
critics of cultural feminism can lead to the conclusion that these
authors advocate classical liberalism. If we reject cooperation and con-
nection, aren't we left with autonomy? The fear of women being
marginalized in the marketplace can be read as a glorification of
255 Bartlett, supra note 149, at 764.
258 See supra note 26 for a partial list of these attacks. For a comprehensive defense of cultural
feminism, see Bender, Gender Difference, supra note 20.
257 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. One of Joan Williams' major examples of the
danger of domesticity is EEOC v. Sears, in which the department store was sued for not hiring
women to commission sales jobs. Williams, Deconstructing, supra note 26, at 813-21 (discussing
EEOC v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 628 F. Stipp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.
1988)). One of the experts for Sears, a noted feminist historian, testified that women do not want
commission sales jobs, because they require long hours and travel time, both of which interfere
with child-raising responsibilities.
Although Williams' discussion of the Sears case provides an important warning of the
potential danger of cultural feminism, it is still an incomplete analysis of the implications of the
case for women. She does not discuss seriously the possibility that in fact Dr. Rosenberg's theories
may be statistically accurate for a majority of women. If an increasing number of studies show
that many women do structure their careers to be compatible with child-raising responsibilities,
then future gender discrimination litigators cannot just dismiss this potential evidence. To take
a more obvious example, suppose that you were a lawyer suing an all-male basketball team for
gender discrimination. It would he foolish for you to deny that women on the average are shorter
than men and at best problematic for you to dispute that height is at least a relevant factor in a
person's ability to play basketball. You should, however, be able to concede that the average woman
will be less skilled at basketball than the average man and still win your case, if you can prove
that defendant failed to hire specific women who were in fact better players than anyone on the
current team. The real problem with Dr. Rosenberg's evidence in Sears was not that it reinforced
stereotypes, but that it should have been considered irrelevant. The solution is not to ignore
stereotypes that may be detrimental to women as a group, but to argue that group-based statistics
cannot be used as a basis for individual decisionmaking. Mary Joe Frug presents a postmodern
analysis of Sears which suggests that both sides viewpoints' were incomplete. Mary Joe Frug, Sexual
Equality and Sexual Difference in American Lam, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 665, 675-82 (1992).
256 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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capitalism and competition.'" Neither a return to liberalismm nor
unintended validation of conservatism24 t will aid feminists' goals; as
Linda Alcoff argues, "feminists need to transcend the dilemma by
developing a third course, an alternative theory of the subject which
avoids both essentialism and nominalism."242
The postmodern emphasis on multiple perspectives and its rejec-
tion of an essential description of "woman" 243
 has contributed much to
contemporary feminism and is hard to repudiate.'" Of course Joan
Williams is right when she says, "[w] omen don't always react as women;
sometimes they react as Democrats, lesbians, bigots or blacks.""' I
259
 Because the aspects of liberal feminism, which in effect tell women that they must "think
like men" and be more like men to be successful, have all but disappeared from feminist
jurisprudence, academic women may overlook the continuing power of this advice in "the real
world." Magazines like Working Women and New Woman, which I imagine have larger circulations
than the Harvard Law Review, continue to assert this philosophy in a variety of ways. Women
who have accepted patriarchal values, particularly those who have chosen to remain childless
(some genuinely voluntarily, some with reluctance and later regret) may vigorously oppose
workplace reform designed to accommodate parenthood and resent co-workers with children,
who they believe expect "special" treatment and hurt other women's chances for success. They,
like Williams, are greatly concerned with stereotypes of women as mothers and go out of their
way to distance themselves from any aspect of "domesticity."
245
 See Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1265 (1993). After
surveying the Critiques of essentialism in contemporary feminism, the author concludes that there
is "an emerging commitment among feminist legal scholars to the renewal and reconception of
liberal theory." Id. at 1286.
241
 In an interesting article, Mary Joe Frug suggests that Gilligan's work can be given both a
conservative and a progressive interpretation. Frug, A Different Voice, supra note 26. Frug suggests
that a progressive reading of Gilligan's work would use it "as a methodology for challenging
gender, as an example of how contingently-formed gender differences can be strategically de-
ployed to unsettle existing inequalities between the sexes." Id. at 52. She is critical of Suzanna
Sherry's "conservative" interpretations of Gilligan. Id. at 60-64.
242
 Linda Aleoft; Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist
Theory, 13 SIGNS 405 (1988).
245 0f particular importance are the convincing critiques by women of color and gays and
lesbians that cultural feminism ignores their perspectives. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 26; Harris,
supra note 26. As I have discussed elsewhere, critics of cultural feminism often employ essentialist
statements in their own work. See supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
244
 Postmodernism has become so popular that whenever an author wants a point of view he
or she accepts to prevail, all she or he needs to do is label it as "posttnodern." Choosing to call
something postmodern has become a substitute for the veneer of neutrality in more traditional
legal scholarship: it enables an author to disguise his or her own subjective viewpoint. A classic
example is Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/law, 77 CORNELL L. littv. 254 (1992). After
discussing the work of Robin West (only a "modernist") and Joan Williams (who Patterson says
tries to be a postmodernist but doesn't really succeed), Patterson concludes with Zillah Eisenstein
(at last, a real postmodernistl ). Because Eisenstein is a posttnodernist, it follows that her view on
pornography (i.e. it can be both good and bad for women depending on your perspective) is
correct, as opposed to Catherine MacKinnon's sadly modernist theories.
245
 Williams, Postmodern, supra note 26, at 323. Williams states that: "[p]ostmodern reformu-
lations of sameness and difference can transform the controversy over whether blacks and whites,
men and women are essentially the same, into quite a different set of debates." Id, at 299.
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doubt if any feminist, regardless of school of thought, would disagree
with this commonsense remark. But postmodern critics of cultural
feminism have created a false dichotomy between cultural feminism
and postrnodernism. 246
Assertions that all cultural feminism is essentialist are often essen- •
tialist themselves. As Leslie Bender puts it, "because of preconceived
notions in the minds of hearers, and our training in the dominant
masculinist scholarly traditions, many feminist difference theorists
have wrongly been heard to make authoritative, universalist claims." 247
Cultural feminism has made significant contributions to feminist
dialogue and continues to provide a perspective which illuminates at
least part of many women's experiences. Its most important theme
remains the insight that gender-based cultural expectations and mores
for girls and boys do produce significant differences in many men and
women, and that all the consciousness raising in the world can never
completely eradicate these differences. I am more convinced than ever
246 One of the many problems with labels is that they can be manipulated according to one's
opinion of the speaker. For example, Joan Williams, in discussing the work of Marie Ashe, which
she likes, goes out of her way to state that Ashe's work "avoids many of the pitfalls of relational
feminism; her description of difference ultimately resembles those of outsider-scholars." Williams,
Postmodern, supra note 20, at 321-22. While I realize that categories are relative and depend on
your perspective, it seems difficult to describe an author who makes statements like "the deep,
primitive and irrational natural forces which move us cannot ever be permanently repressed by
law and language" and "[dines the strongest of stitching come from our bodies?" (Ashe, supra
note 184, at 558.) and "What if we wrote with words from the deepest part of our bodies, our
selves?" (Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the
Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355, 358 (1989)) as anything but a biological feminist. Most critics of
cultural feminism, including Williams herself, consider biological feminism as a sub-part of
cultural feminism.
247 Bender, Gender Difference, supra note 20, at 22. While much of the criticism of cultural
feminism points out many of its major flaws and contributes significantly to the dialogue about
feminism, at times the criticism becomes extremely strained and based on what appears to be
deliberate misinterpretations of the work. For example, Jeanne Schroeder criticizes Leslie Bender
for referring to the public/private dichotomy as "false." Supra note 20, at 127 n.42. Schroeder
states that;
the term 'false' seems to imply either that the dichotomy is illusory or that it does
not meet some predetermined concept of truth. If one accepts, as I do, that the
public-private distinction is one of the primary structures of masculinist law that
functions to maintain women in a subordinate position, then one would say this
dichotomy is very, very real. I can, therefore, understand arguments that this
dichotomy is not logically required, is often indeterminate, and is oppressive, but
hardly that it is false.
Id. By focusing only on an out-of-context technical meaning of the word "false," Schroeder ignores
the fact that Bender's work describes the dichotomy in exactly the way Schroeder suggests is
appropriate. Bender recognizes that the dichotomy is "real" in the sense Schroeder means; she
explicitly states throughout all her work that it is one of the primary tools of oppression used
against women.
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of this theory now that I am a parent attempting to raise my daughter
and son in non-gendered ways. 248
 These differences can and do tran-
scend race and class.249
 Children of all races and classes watch television
and Disney features. 25" Both K-Mart and Bloomingdales sell girls
clothes in pink and boys clothes in blue.
As a corollary, it is generally true that these cultural differences
result in women engaging in more relational, cooperative behavior and
men in more competitive behavior. Numerous studies have established
that mothers are more bonded to their children than fathers, 25 ' spend
more time on child-raising,'" and are more likely to want custody in
the event of a divorce. 255
 All of these differences are significant; we
ignore them at our peril. Feminists writing in the area of family law
have already convincingly demonstrated that theories of formal equal-
ity which ignore women's differences regarding attitudes toward chil-
dren result in actual inequality. 254
Joan Williams' call for a "Gilligan in reverse," 255
 if unchallenged,
can lead to observations just as essentialist and inaccurate as the worst
possible readings of Gilligan. Williams' own examples illustrate the
dangers of a superficial approach to these "similarities." After asserting
that women often enjoy power just as much as men, she states that
"dealing with a two-year old is one of the recurring great power strug-
gles in the cycle of human life." 256
 This is true, but not in the sense
Williams means. Williams is apparently suggesting that this "power
struggle" is similar to a hostile corporate takeover. 257
 This is patently
248
 Williams suggests that parents exaggerate these differences. Williams, Gender Wars, ,supra
note 26. There is some validity to this observation, but most of the differences are easily observ-
able. It is a fact, not my perception, that my daughter wants to play exclusively with other girls,
219 This is not to say that race and class differences do not matter. In many instances these
differences arc far more important than gender differences.
250 The effects of television and films on reinforcing gender stereotypes are well-documented.
See, e.g., ALFRED B. FIEnautuN J. HUMAN SEX-ROLE BEHAVIOR (1981); Marcia R. Lieberman,
"Some Day My Prince Will Come": Female Acculturation Through the Fairy Tale, in SEXISM AND
Yo•'ll 228,228-43 (Diane Gersoni-Staun ed. 1974).
251
 Fineman, supra note 143, at 769.
252 Id. Authors like \Vahan's, Gender Wars, supra note 26, and Czapinsky, supra note 212,
would argue that this statistic proves nothing, because women are forced into assuming respon-
sibility for their children. Fur my counter-arguments to this proposition, see supra notes 217-28
and accompanying text.
255 See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. Rev. 1,43-45 (1991) (citations omitted).
254 See, e.g., FINEMAN, =Ara note 139.
255 Williams, Deconstructing, supra note 26, at 840.
258 Id. at 843.
257 This may he an unhtir reading of Williams, but 1 am not convinced that it is. Obviously,
Williams does not literally compare dealing with a two-year-old to a hostile corporate takeover,
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absurd. A parent can always "win" a power struggle with a child if she
chooses. After all, we are bigger and stronger than our children—if
nothing else we can just pick up the screaming, kicking little brat and
carry her to her room. What makes the real daily power struggle with
two-year olds more complex and challenging than a hostile takeover
is that the parent's goal is not really to "win"—it is to find that perfect
balance of discipline and love that will help the child learn that certain
rules must be obeyed, but that will not completely suppress the child's
natural and desirable need for some independence.
.In another example disputing Gilligan's analysis of playground
games, Jeanne Schroeder argues that in fact boys are taught coopera-
tive behavior, through the mechanism of team sports, whereas girls'
sports, such as hopscotch or jump rope, tend to emphasize competitive
behavior."' But Schroeder's assertion that team sports foster "coopera-
tive," relational behavior among boys provides an incomplete view of
such sports. 259 It is true that team members learn to work together
through sports, but this "cooperative" model is designed to accomplish
a single goal—beating the other team. (Schroeder's notion that sports
are always "gentlemanly" and played with extreme deference to deci-
sionmakers,25° should also seem naive to anyone familiar with Bobby
Knight or John McEnroe.) 261 This type of "cooperation," with its mottos
and she does acknowledge that "nurturing involves a sophisticated use of power in a hierarchical
relationship." Id, However, she makes the statement in the context of a highly critical discussion
of Carol Gilligan's work, in which she strongly disagrees with Gilligan's conclusion that women
are less competitive and less interested in power than men. Because a hostile corporate takeover
is a good example of a competitive, power-laden situation, usually involving men instead of
women, it seems reasonable to suggest that she was attempting to draw such a parallel. Williams
also states that the difference between being a boss and a mother in this regard are differences
in degree as well as in kind." Id.
258 Schroeder, .supra note 20, at 131-33.
259I also question Schroeder's characterization of hopscotch and jump rope as competitive,
because the games usually more closely resemble solitaire. See, e.g., jEssiE H. BANCROFT, GAMES
116-17 (1937) (describing hopscotch as a game for 1 to 10 players). The basic objective of the
game is described as avoiding missing. The same is true for jump rope. Id. at 208-13. jump rope
chants also reinforce traditional nurturing role models for girls. See LILIJAN FRANKEL & GODFREY
MASTERS, ME GIAM' BOOK or GAMES, 63 (1952), which recites the following classic jump rope
chant:
Does he love me?
Yes, no, yes, no, yes.
Where will we get married?
Church, synagogue, house, barn.
How many children will we have?
One, two, three, four ....
21r Schroeder, supra note 20 at 132-33.
261 Bobby Knight, basketball coach at Indiana, is famous for being thrown out of games by
referees. John McEnroe, a major tennis star, has upset the staid atmosphere at Wimbledon more
December 19931
	
CULTURAL FEMINIST THEMES
	 43
like "winning isn't everything, it's the only thing,"262 is very different
from women working together to take care of children 2" or to sew a
quilt. The sanctions for not being a good team member ("letting the
team down") are harsh and contribute to a boy's perception of himself
as an autonomous individual. For many adolescent boys, there is no
worse fate than being bad at sports, just as for many adolescent girls
there is no worse fate than not being "pretty. ”264
Cultural differences between men and women can also manifest
themselves in significant stylistic ways—the ways men and women carry
on a conversation or the body language they use. These differences
result in conscious and subconscious perceptions which may disadvan-
tage women. Cultural feminism can help accomplish the postmodern
goal of aiding understanding of women's multiple perspectives by
than once by hurling choice obscenities at the referees. See, e.g., Larry Fine, McEnroe in Middle
Again as Thin tiers Flare, RarrER LIBRARY REPORT, Sept. 7,1902.
262 This statement is popularly attributed to Vince Lombardi.
263 Women in different societies commonly engage in cooperative child-raising activities. See,
e.g., GF,RMAINE GREER, SEX AND DESTINY 284-301 (1984). Greer describes child-raising in ex-
tended families. After noting that it may strike the reader as strange that a feminist would present
the family as a model, she argues that "[t]he family offers the paradigm for the female collectivity;
it shows us women cooperating to dignify their lives, to lighten each others' labor, and growing
in real love and sisterhood, a word we use constantly without any real idea of what it is." Id.
at 286.
264
 In the words or the poet William Butler Yeats:
And there upon
That beautiful mild woman for whose sake
There's many a one shall find out all heartache
On finding that her voice is sweet and low
Replied: `To be born woman is to know—
Although they do not talk of it at school—
That we must labour to be beautiful."
William Butler Yeats, Adam's Curse, in CHIEF MODERN POETS OE ENGLAND AND AMERICA VOL. 1,
I-105-6 (4th ed. 1905) (Gerald D. Sanders, John H. Nelson, & M.L. Rosenthal eds.). See also
NAOMI WOLF, 'EDE BEAUTY MYTH: How IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST WOMEN (1991),
I raised Schroeder's point about sports not only because l believe she is wrong, but also because
I think the points she raises about sports help illustrate what I think is a critical difference itt the
socialization of many girls and many boys. Boys are expected to be good at sports, which is a
finite quest for victory (a 7-0 score is almost as good as a 7-0 score); girls are expected to he
good at being beautiful, which is a bottomless search for perfection.
The difference in the two goals continues to affect gendered attitudes towards more sophis-
ticated adult "games." I was once asked by a male lawyer how 1 could say that women are generally
less competitive than men, when most of the women lawyers he knew worked far harder than
their male counterparts. I would agree that far too many women professionals work much longer
hours than they need to and seem driven beyond any reasonable standards to succeed. However,
the word I would use to describe their behavior is not competitive—it is compulsive. Women who
become professionals enter into a particularly stressful existence, because tinder the boys' rules,
being perfect means winning, But winning is not enough, they must still be perfect—for compul-
sive women a 7-6 score is not the same as a 7-0 score.
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providing explanations for these stylistic differences. For example,
during my four years on our faculty appointments committee, I have
observed a significant difference in the way many men and women
interview at the AALS hiring conference. 2"• More men than women
dominated the discussion, gave highly confident, direct answers and
asked aggressive questions to the interviewers. More women than men
appeared hesitant, equivocal and quiet. Our former dean used to ask
every applicant what he or she expected that people would say about
him or her when they spotted him or her ten years from now at an
AALS convention. Men tended to answer something like "Well, Dean
Walwer, I am confident that they will identify me by my seminal trea-
tise266 on the termination of copyright transfers, and by my latest lead
Harvard Law Review article." Women's answers were more along the
lines of "I guess I'll just be happy if they say I'm a good scholar and
teacher." Not too surprisingly, most of the men on my hiring commit-
tee would give the first speaker a higher score than the second. I've
found cultural feminism useful as a device to explain to sympathetic
male colleagues that the woman may be just as consumed with desire
to write the ultimate work on termination of transfers as the male
applicant and just as inwardly confident of her ability to accomplish
this feat, but that there was a good chance that she was socialized from
birth to appear modest and self-effacing. It is true that in the hands of
some of my male colleagues my explanation could be twisted en-
tirely out of proportion ("Even Linda admits that women lack self-
confidence") , 267 but that type of person will always be able to come up
with some sort of excuse not to hire women anyway. 268
2c6 These personal observations are not unique and are supported by a number of studies.
See John M. Conley, William Barr and E. Allan Lind, The Power of Language: Presentational Style
in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE Li. 1375 (description of studies of presentational style in trial
witness' testimony). The study found differences in male and female speech, with women wit-
nesses exhibiting a "powerless" style--tentative or uncertain—more than men. See generally Peggy
C, Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and "Feminine" Style, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635, 1646-55 (1991) (sources cited therein discuss other studies showing differ-
ences in women's and men's speech, with a general pattern of tentativeness in women's speech).
266 The cliché of "seminal" work is of course a classic example of a male's perspective shaping
our language, in this case our language regarding academic excellence.
267 This hypothetical comment does illustrate the dangers of cultural feminism and use of
studies demonstrating differences between men and women. Studies do generally show that in
fact more women than men lack self-confidence and continued lack of self-confidence can be
fatal in classroom teaching. In my original hypothetical, I pictured a woman applicant who only
appeared to be less self-confident. than the male applicant, a common situation. The issue of how
to evaluate the woman applicant who actually is less self-confident than the male applicant is
more complex. I would continue to argue that this woman should at least be considered, because
many women teachers have successfully overcome lack of self-confidence in the classroom, but I
recognize that this will be a difficult task in many cases,
265 Almost anything women say or do can become a weapon in the hands of our enemies.
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Cultural feminists have also made important contributions to the
goal of restructuring our legal system. The language and ideals of
cultural feminism are more compatible with the progressive goal of
redistribution of wealth than traditional liberal thought and the con-
cept of an "ethic of care" represents a real challenge to patriarchal
legal models. Leslie Bender explains that "our statutory and common
law legal system can develop new categories of civil law analysis (rather
than criminal or regulatory law) that recognize and value relationships,
interpersonal responsibility, and human needs for safety, health, edu-
cation, and security, rather than its traditional focus on money and
commodity. n269
A postmodern approach to cultural feminism should recognize
that there may be areas of the law in which its themes have much to
offer, and other areas where it is dangerous."' When feminists speak
of "an ethic of care and responsibility" in contracts,"I torts, 272 prop-
erty,273 or criminal procedure, 274 they are, if nothing else, introducing
concepts relatively unknown in these fields. This is particularly true in
areas of the law traditionally associated with business, such as bank-
ruptcy"' or taxation. 276 Cultural feminist ideas in these areas may
Many women on predominantly male faculties have had the experience of seeing our words
distorted, but that has not stopped us from speaking, nor should it. As Leslie Bender says:
If stereotypes arc going to be used against us, as they have been in the past, they
will be used regardless of what we say or do. Those who want to exercise their power
by disadvantaging women based on stereotypes did so long before we celebrated
women's cultures and will do so long after, no matter what strategy we select in our
struggle for justice for women.
Bender, Gender Difference, .supra note 20, at 44.
Some feminist authors in their concern about stereotypes seem to have a naive assumption
of good Faith among decisionmakers. Joan Williams' discussion of the Sears case hints at the
possibility that the judge was determined to decide the case for Sears under any circumstance.
See Williams, Deconstructing, supra note 26, at 813-21. Dr. Rosenberg's testimony just provided
him with a convenient excuse,
255 Bender, Gender Difference, supra note 20, at 46.
275 See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
271 See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997
(1985); Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM.
U. L. REv. 1005 (1985).
272 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Changing the Values in Tort Law, 25 Tulsa U. 759 (1990); Lucinda
Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issue in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
41 (1989),
2" See, e.g., Margaret. J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
274 Mary 1. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the. Rights of Relationships,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (1987).
275 See Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptg System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88
MICH. L. REV. 1506 (1990) (Gilligan-influenced description of the different attitudes women may
have toward debts).
270 Marjorie Kornhauscr, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income lax Movement.' A 731pical
Male Reaction, 86 Mien, L. REV. 465 (1987).
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backfire and produce harmful results for women and other subordi-
nated groups,277 but they have not traditionally been the "master's
tools."278 Most white men are completely taken aback by ideas like
Leslie Bender's suggestion that tortfeasors perform a personal service
to compensate their victims. 278
Some critics of cultural feminism have suggested that while its
goals are desirable, they should be couched in gender-neutral terms,
as "humanist" goals. 28° There may be times when this strategy is desir-
able, but I think it would be a serious mistake to abandon the idea of
"woman" as an organizing category. 281 As Linda Alcoff writes, in advo-
cating the desirability of identity politics, lilt is the claiming of their
identity as women as a political point of departure that makes it
possible to see, for example, gender-biased language that in the ab-
sence of that departure point women do not always notice." 282
277
 For a critique of Leslie Bender's concept of a duty to rescue and an argument that it will
harm women, see Schroeder, supra note 20, at 138-40.
278 Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTF;R OUT-
SIDER 110 (1984).
275 See Feminist Legal Theory Enters Business Area WALL ST. J., June 4, 1992, at 1, 8 ("Some
corporate lawyers find the proposals baffling and impractical. 'It's just so far from the way the
legal system currently operates that 1-1 just don't have a reaction to it,' said Gary Lynch, a
partner at the New York law firm Davis, Polk & Wardwell.").
In contrast, statements about morality in abortion dialogue may lead to pandering approval
among country-club Republicans. See Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., Good Leaders Share Burdens of Followers,
TuLsA WORLD, Aug. 18, 1992, at A7 (author, in discussing Barbara Bush's remarks on abortion,
states: IvIery likely, both Bushes are frantically signalling friends and peers among the so-called
`Country Club Republicans' that—hint! hint! nudge! nudge!—they needn't get all bent out of
shape over the Houston triumph of the hot-eyed anti-abortion fanatics.").
28a Williams, Deconstructing, supra note 26, at 843-45. Both Williams and Schroeder make a
related, but separate criticism of cultural feminism. They assert that cultural feminists pretend
that certain aspects of the theories they espouse were invented by feminists, while these theories
actually owe their origins to male philosophers. This criticism incorporates at least a partial
misreading of some cultural feminist work. Most cultural feminists do not necessarily claim that
their critique of "objectivity" and "neutrality" is original; only that it is central to their theory.
As a corollary, Jeanne Schroeder states "feminists tend to ignore the writing of male philoso-
phers who have struggled with many of the same issues." Schroeder, supra note 20, at 208.
Schroeder's criticism masks an elitist assumption that the feminists she criticizes are completely
familiar with all the philosophers she would like them to cite, or, if they are not, then they should
be. I do not discount the importance of philosophy as a central part of feminist theory and I
suppose that in an ideal world every feminist trained in the law would also be perfectly versed in
other disciplines. I would suggest, however, that Schroeder's elitism may be just a little off-putting
to women beginning to enter the field, If the most prominent feminist scholars make complete
familiarity with the fields of philosophy, sociology, literature, science, psychology, etc., a barrier
to entry for feminist jurisprudence, the area will be primarily limited to a select few who will not
provide the diversity of experience that postmodernists like Schroeder claim to revere.
281 See Alcoff, supra note 242, at 451-36.
282
 Id. at 432.
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For example, in discussing the problems women face in obtaining
custody of their children, Joan Williams advocates adoption of the pri-
mary caretaker presumption because it is gender neutral, as opposed
to the clearly gender-based "tender years" doctrine. 283 The strongest
arguments for supporting the presumption, however, stem from a
gender-based cultural feminist analysis. The current predominant
"best interests of the child" standard appears to be the perfect "human-
ist" way to determine which parent receives custody. The problem is
that this extremely vague and flexible standard is often interpreted in
highly sexist ways which result in women being more likely than not
to lose custody in a contested divorce. 284 Additionally, the uncertainty
of the outcome of the standard gives the father a "bargaining chip" in
a divorce situation—he can threaten a custody battle if the mother
does not agree to give up her economic rights. 285 These two reasons,
both of which are explicitly based on gender analysis, provide powerful
reasons for supporting the doctrine, which a gender-neutral "human-
ist" analysis does not accomplish.
Finally, I believe cultural feminism's positive affirmation of
women's lives and its optimism is desirable. 286 I cannot agree with Mary
Joe Frug, one of the most important postmodernists, that "the anger
and pessimism connected with negative feminism produces a more
positive political residue than the form of sentimental boosterism that
often accompanies cultural feminism."'" Anger can be a powerful
283 Williams, Decon.sEruding, supra note 26, at. 838-39.
284 See Fineman & Opie, supra note 144, at 120 & n.7. See also Mahoney, supra note 253, at
45 (citations omitted). Mahoney uses, as an example, a particularly outrageous case in which a
battered woman had sought refuge for herself and her children in a shelter. The judge, using
the best interests standard, awarded custody to the battering father, because he provided a better
home. Id.
285 See FINEMAN, supra note 139; Sack, supra note 139.
288
 My Favorite example of the themes of difference feminism is a speech made by a very
prominent woman in legal education. She began her speech, "I am the mother of two wonderful
daughters, a law professor, an administrator," continued with a long list of professional achieve-
ments, and concluded, 1 have listed these things in the order of their importance to me." While
I recognize that many feminists may have valid concerns about a woman beginning her self-defini-
tion with her role as someone's mother (as wife, or daughter), I don't really believe that was this
woman's point. I think that she was simply affirming an idea that seems intuitively obvious and
right to me—that human relationships are more important than career achievements.
287 Frog, supra note 237, at 673. I also have to disagree with an example used by Frug to
repudiate cultural feminism. Frug tells a story of a woman and a man trying on suits which are
too long in the legs and too tight across the hips. The man says everything is fine, the woman
says her legs are too short and her hips are too big. Id. at 665. Frug uses this story to draw
analogies to liberal feminism (liberal feminists would say clothes stores must be changed to
include an equal number of clothes which fit women) and cultural feminism ("cultural feminists
would say that women must learn to feel more comfortable with our actual appearances, that we
should give up our desire to conform to the fantasies men have invented for feminine attractive-
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motivating force, but it can also be destructive and immobilizing. Too
many women turn their anger inward, often in the form of self-destruc-
tive behavior, and this type of anger cannot lead to positive results.
Some aspects of cultural feminism may have the potential to degener-
ate into a mushy version of the 70's pop psychology book "I'm OK,
You're OK," but a truly postmodern approach to feminism should
incorporate both anger and affirmation. There is much to be angry
about, but there is also much to celebrate. Feminist authors should not
let a healthy caution about essentialism keep us from talking about
what we have in common, because it is exploration of similar experi-
ences (and differences) that gives us a sense of identity and purpose.
"Until we find each other, we are alone. '288
ness.") Id. She then goes on to say that postrnodernists would reject both approaches as likely
to recreate and perpetuate the problem of the relationship between sexual difference and
equality." Id. Ironically, however, Frug couldn't have chosen a more poignant example of the
need for celebration of women's attributes than her anecdote. Anorexia and bulimia are now
recognized as serious, sometimes fatal diseases, caused by women's poor esteem. It is estimated
that 25 percent of U.S. and Canadian women suffer from these diseases. See, e.g., Joyce Steller,
Film Shows Women Dying to Be Thin, GUARDIAN, June 3, 1992, at 19. Even Princess Diana, a woman
who would appear to "have everything" is apparently not immune. See PEOPLE MAG., Aug. 3, 1992,
at 60-68. Of course, 1 recognize that Frog is not literally suggesting that women should not
validate their bodies, the anecdote is an analogy used to illustrate an aspect of cultural feminism,
but I regard it as a more powerful analogy as to why affirmation and celebration of women's
differences are still important ingredients of feminist theory.
2mADRIENNE R1C11, THE DREAM OF A COMMON LANGUAGE 14 (1978).
